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I. INTRODUCTION
Many nonprofit organizations are governed by boards of directors
comprised of individuals who often have been invited to join the board
based on their contributions of time and money. For many, this is either
their first board membership or yet another conducted within an
environment lacking the experience and structure of board governance
typically found in a publicly-traded corporation. Accordingly, governance
of many nonprofit enterprises presents both similarities to and differences
from the governance of a for-profit entity.
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How is nonprofit governance different from that conducted in forprofit organizations? How do you build the best board for your nonprofit?
What attributes and skills are required by law and what mix of experiences
and talents will give you the best result? What are the commonly required
director attributes that are a must for each board, and how do you
customize and fine-tune your efforts to achieve a high-performance
board? Optimal board composition—achieving the best mix of director
skills and experience—will depend on many enterprise-specific
variables. 1 Some of the most important of these for nonprofits include, but
are not limited to: (1) enterprise lifecycle stage, (2) extent to which certain
experiences and skills are mission critical (detailed understanding of
target culture, mission, stake-holder composition, and risk); (3) unique
technology dependence (social media); and (4) the need for capacity
expansion (fundraising). 2 Our goal in writing this paper is to provide the
* BA, The American University; MBA, The George Washington University; J.D., Oklahoma City
University School of Law. Mr. Trautman is Associate Professor of Business Law and Ethics at Prairie
View A&M University and is a former president of the New York and Washington/Baltimore chapters
of the National Association of Corporate Directors (NACD). He may be contacted at
Lawrence.J.Trautman@gmail.com.
** BM, Furman University; JD, University of South Carolina School of Law. Ms. Ford is Associate
Professor of Business Law at Western Carolina University. She may be contacted at
jford@email.wcu.edu.
The authors wish to extend particular thanks to the following for their assistance in the research and
preparation of this article: Deborah Cannon, Sharon Foster; Peter Gleason, Jack Lowe, Dennis
McCuistion; Stephen Newton; Peter C. Ormerod; and Becky White. All errors and omissions are our
own.1. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Why a Board? Group Decisionmaking in Corporate Governance,
55 VAND. L. REV. 1–55 (2002); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Smith v. Van Gorkom (UCLA School of
Law, Law-Econ Research Paper No. 08-13, 2008), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1130972
[https://perma.cc/6WA2-JXKU]; Stephen M. Bainbridge, Corporate Governance and U.S. Capital
Market Competitiveness (UCLA School of Law, Law-Econ Research Paper No. 10-13, 2010),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1696303 [https://perma.cc/GXJ6-YB6H]; Renee Adams, Benjamin E.
Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, The Role of Boards of Directors in Corporate Governance: A
Conceptual Framework and Survey (National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No.
14486, 2008), http://www.nber.org/papers/w14486 [https://perma.cc/229Q-LWXK]; Lucian A.
Bebchuk, Joseph E. Bachelder, Roel C. Campos, Byron S. Georgiou, Alan G. Hevesi, William Lerach,
Robert Mendelsohn, Robert A.G. Monks, Toby Myerson, John F. Olson, Leo E. Strine Jr. & John C.
Wilcox, Director Liability, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. No. 3, 1011–45 (2006) (presenting an excellent
discussion of post Sarbanes-Oxley director liability from the edited transcript of a forum on personal
liability of directors held at Harvard Law School in November 2005.); Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma
Cohen & Allen Ferrell, What Matters in Corporate Governance?, 22(2) REV. FIN. STUD. 783 (2009);
Lucian A. Bebchuk & Michael S. Weisbach, The State of Corporate Governance Research, 23 REV.
FIN. STUD. NO. 3, 939–61 (2010); Jay Dahya & John J. McConnell, Outside Directors and Corporate
Board Decisions: A Natural Experiment (2001), AFA 2003 Washington, DC Meetings,
http://ssrn.com/abstract=354380 [https://perma.cc/8DKV-UCPJ].
2. See e.g., Rajesh K. Aggarwal, Mark E. Evans & Dhananjay Nanda, Nonprofit Boards: Size,
Performance, and Managerial Incentives, 53(1) J. ACCT. & ECON. 466 (2012); Ellen P. Aprill, What
Critiques of Sarbanes-Oxley Can Teach About Regulation of Nonprofit Governance, 76(2) FORDHAM
L. REV. 765 (2007); Carter G. Bishop, The Deontological Significance of Nonprofit Corporate
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following: answers to these basic questions; a roadmap for the nonprofit
enterprise faced with recruiting a board; a matrix methodology that every
nominating committee and board can employ to systematically inventory
their people, assets, strengths and weaknesses, define their needs, and
explore their options; and provoke radical thinking about how any

Governance Standards: A Fiduciary Duty of Care Without a Remedy, 57 CATH. U. L. REV. 701
(2008); Kathleen M. Boozang, Does an Independent Board Improve Nonprofit Corporate
Governance? (Seton Hall Public Law Research Paper No. 1002421, 2007),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1002421 [https://perma.cc/WJ6Y-ERM6]; L. David Brown, Sanjeev
Khagram, Mark H. Moore & Peter Frumkin, Globalization, Ngos and Multi-Sectoral Relations
(2000), https://ssrn.com/abstract=253110 [https://perma.cc/X9FY-8EXH]; L. David Brown, Jane G.
Covey & Mark Leach, Organization Development for Social Change, in HANDBOOK OF
ORGANIZATION DEVELOPMENT (2004), https://ssrn.com/abstract=622244 [https://perma.cc/P45XAEVC]; Nicholas Donatiello, David F. Larcker & Brian Tayan, What Can For-Profit and Nonprofit
Boards Learn from Each Other About Improving Governance? (Stanford University Graduate School
of Business Research Paper No. 15-28, 2015), https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/facultyresearch/publications/what-can-profit-nonprofit-boards-learn-each-other-about-improving
[https://perma.cc/6BZV-GVKN]; Brian D. Galle, Social Enterprise: Who Needs it?, 54 B.C. L. REV.
(2013); Brian D. Galle, Keep Charity Charitable, 88 TEXAS L. REV. 1213 (2010); Erica Harris,
Christine Petrovits & Michelle Yetman, The Effect of Nonprofit Governance on Donations: Evidence
from the Revised Form 990, 90(2) ACCT. REV. 579 (2014); Henry Hansmann & Reinier H. Kraakman,
The Essential Role of Organizational Law, 110 YALE L.J. 387 (2000); Thomas Lee Hazen & Lisa
Love Hazen, Punctilios and Nonprofit Corporate Governance—A Comprehensive Look at Nonprofit
Directors’ Fiduciary Duties, 14(2) U. PA. J. BUS. L. 347 (2012); Bernd Helmig, Marc Jegers & Irvine
Lapsley, Challenges in Managing Nonprofit Organizations: A Research Overview, 15 INT’L J. VOL.
& NONPROFIT ORGANS. 101 (2004); Klaus J. Hopt, The Board of Nonprofit Organizations: Some
Corporate Governance Thoughts from Europe (Euro. Corp. Gov. Inst.—Law Working Paper No.
125/2009, 2009), https://ssrn.com/abstract=1425670 [https://perma.cc/Q5EC-5B69]; Jill R. Horwitz,
Does Nonprofit Ownership Matter?, 24 YALE J. REG. 140 (2007); Garry W. Jenkins, Who’s Afraid of
Philanthrocapitalism?, 61(3) CASE W. RES. L. REV. (2011); Robert A. Katz & Antony Page, The Role
of Social Enterprise, 35 VT. L. REV. 59 (2010); Melanie B. Leslie, The Wisdom of Crowds?
Groupthink and Nonprofit Governance, 62 FLA. L. REV. 1179 (2010); Christine W. Letts, Effective
Foundation Boards: The Importance of Roles (KSG Working Paper No. RWP05-054,
2005), https://ssrn.com/abstract=642562 [https://perma.cc/UQ9Y-SUTX]; Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer &
Brendan M. Wilson, Regulating Charities in the 21st Century: An Institutional Choice Analysis, 85(2)
CHI-KENT L. REV. 479 (2010); Ira M. Millstein, Katherine M. O’Regan & Sharon M. Oster,
Governance Practices Among Nonprofit Organizations Contracting with New York City (Yale SOM
Working Paper No. PM-02, 2000), https://ssrn.com/abstract=244412 [https://perma.cc/Q3K9-STTF];
Lumen N. Mulligan, What’s Good for the Goose is Not Good for the Gander: Sarbanes-Oxley-Style
Nonprofit Reforms, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1981 (2007); J. Haskell Murray & Edward I. Hwang, Purpose
with Profit: Governance, Enforcement, Capital-Raising and Capital-Locking in Low-Profit Limited
Liability Companies, 66 U. MIAMI L. REV. (2011); Michael F. Murray, Private Management of Public
Spaces: Nonprofit Organizations and Urban Parks, 34 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 179 (2010); Katherine
M. O’Regan & Sharon M. Oster, Does Government Funding Alter Nonprofit Governance? Evidence
from New York City Nonprofit Contractors (Yale SOM Working Paper No. PM-03, 2001),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=279310 [https://perma.cc/HTE9-YVXN]; Antony Page & Robert Katz, Is
Social Enterprise the New Corporate Social Responsibility?, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. (2011); Dana
Brakman Reiser, Regulating Social Enterprise, 14 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 231 (2014); Usha Rodrigues,
Entity and Identity, 60 EMORY L.J. 1257 (2011).
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enterprise-specific system of governance may be improved by questioning
existing fundamental assumptions.
Our article proceeds in six parts. First, we offer a few thoughts about
nonprofits, their various missions, and common challenges nonprofits
face. Second, we discuss why good governance is important in a nonprofit
setting and highlight examples of frauds that have been reported due to
the absence of good governance. Third, we present a look at Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) requirements imposed on nonprofits. Fourth, we
explore the law of nonprofit corporate governance applicable to all
directors serving on the board of a nonprofit. Fifth, we discuss board
composition and committee structure. Sixth, we present a process that
involves an inventory of current board strengths and weaknesses and then
offer some thoughts about use of a matrix template to assist in discovering
necessary board skills and experiences of board candidates.
The search for optimal board composition is not set out in a vacuum;
rather, it is based on a clear prejudice by the authors that all current
enterprise operations should be a part of and based upon articulated
organizational strategy that is headed somewhere with purpose and clearly
communicated to all involved. Hopefully, constructive thinking about
board composition, succession planning, and a productive dialogue
among all board members will result.
II. NONPROFITS ARE DIFFERENT
Many board members of nonprofit organizations serve because they
believe in the mission of the enterprise, whether it is housing and feeding
the homeless, finding a cure for cancer, or any of the numerous causes
that seek to make our world a better place. Often nonprofit directors are
recruited after they have shown financial support for the organization.
Unlike in most for-profit settings, it is not unusual for board directors in a
nonprofit environment to have little or no prior experience in corporate
governance before joining the board. This creates a special need to onboard new nonprofit directors by providing basic or continuing education
regarding legal responsibilities germane to the fiduciary duties of
directorship.
According to Forbes, the 100 largest U.S. charities, “together
received $49 billion in gifts, a whopping 12% of the $410 billion taken in
by the country’s 1 million-plus nonprofits.” 3 The Washington Post
reports: “More than 1.6 million nonprofit groups are registered with the
3. William P. Barrett, ed., America’s Top Charities 2018, FORBES (Dec. 11, 2018),
https://www.forbes.com/top-charities/#42859eb676ab [https://perma.cc/3MYH-HHHF].

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2019

5

Akron Law Review, Vol. 52 [2019], Iss. 4, Art. 2

976

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[52:971

federal government, and they control more than $4.5 trillion in assets. An
additional 700,000 organizations, such as churches and smaller groups,
need not register.” 4 Exhibit 1 provides a listing of the Top 10 U.S.
charities ranked by private support.
Exhibit 1
Top Ten 2018 U.S. Charities Ranked by Private Support 5
Rank

Name

Private
Support

Donor
Dependency

1

United Way Worldwide

$3.471 B

100%

2

Feeding America

$2.654 B

99%

3

Americares Foundation

$2.379 B

81%

4

Task Force for Global Health

$2.161 B

101%

5

Salvation Army

$2.033B

69%

6

St. Jude Children’s Research Hospital

$1.511 B

57%

7

Direct Relief

$1.238 B

101%

8

Habitat for Humanity International

$1.095 B

94%

9

Boys & Girls Clubs of America

$989 M

80%

10

YMCA of the USA

$974 M

55%

Source: Forbes

A.

The Business of Philanthropy

Philanthropy is a business, and just like other businesses, it has
finance, marketing, accounting, auditing, and operational challenges.
However, unlike an electronic component manufacturer, many nonprofit
and philanthropic enterprises have laser-like focus on raising and
investing monies necessary to fund operations and making every dollar
count. Yet, how is it in a world of unimaginable productivity and affluence

4. See Joe Stephens & Mary Pat Flaherty, Inside the hidden world of thefts, scams and
phantom purchases at the nation’s nonprofits, WASH. POST (Oct. 26, 2013),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/inside-the-hidden-world-of-thefts-scams-andphantom-purchases-at-the-nations-nonprofits/2013/10/26/825a82ca-0c26-11e3-99416711ed662e71_story.html?utm_term=.492b8c444037 [https://perma.cc/TE9C-9EK3].
5. The 100 Largest U.S. Charities, FORBES (2018), https://www.forbes.com/top-charities/list/
[https://perma.cc/FVC3-SWDA].
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that we still have “the persistence of poverty and need, of disease and
suffering”? 6 Dan Pallotta writes:
We give money to charities because we do want progress. We want
things to change, not stay the same. Somewhere in the depths of our
hearts we have a desire to make a difference. We all want our lives to
matter. In an often dreary world, each dollar we give is a sign that we
have not yet lost hope. In the midst of our busy lives, each contribution
is a sign that we have not forgotten about all those who live in poverty,
despair, and abandonment. Out of this basic charity inside of us has
grown a charity outside of us—a multibillion-dollar industry employing
millions of people who work to turn our contributions into positive
change. We put our trust not just in individual charities, but in the system
of charity itself to take our offerings and make of them a better world. 7

B.

Common Challenges of NonProfit Governance

Jack Lowe of Dallas, Texas was the recipient of the 2012 Lifetime
Achievement Award from the National Association of Corporate
Directors (NACD). 8 His many contributions to his community exceed the
space limitation of this article. However, in brief, Jack Lowe is a former
Chairman of the Board of Directors of Zale Corporation; a former
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of TDIndustries (a national
mechanical, electrical, and plumbing construction and facility service
company); director of Drew Industries Incorporated; and former director
of KDC Holdings, LLC (a private real estate development and investment
firm).
In his career, Jack has been active in many civic and industry
organizations, including serving on the boards of the Dallas Citizens
Council, Salesmanship Club of Dallas, United Way of Metropolitan
Dallas, Better Business Bureau of Metropolitan Dallas, Dallas Zoological
Society, the advisory council of the Communities Foundation of Texas,
Quality Texas Foundation, Texas Business and Education Coalition, and
the Senior Citizens of Greater Dallas. His past community service
includes serving on the boards of the Dallas Chapter of the American Red
Cross, Center for Nonprofit Management, Cotton Bowl Athletic
Association, Dallas County Community College District Foundation,
Greater Dallas Chamber of Commerce, and Construction Education
6. See DAN PALLOTTA, UNCHARITABLE: HOW RESTRAINTS ON NONPROFITS UNDERMINE
THEIR POTENTIAL xi (2008).
7. Id. at 4.
8. NACD DIRECTORSHIP 100, NACD B. Kenneth West Lifetime Achievement Award (2012),
https://www.nacdonline.org/directorship100/2012honorees.cfm [https://perma.cc/3HTQ-SLMU].
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Foundation. He is the past president of the Dallas Alliance, and the
Community Council of Greater Dallas. He served for many years on the
Board of Trustees of the Dallas Independent School District and as its
president. He has been the Business Co-chair of the Texas Business and
Education Coalition and on the board of the Center for the Reform of
School Systems since 2000. He continues to chair the board of the
Greenleaf Center for Servant Leadership. Jack Lowe believes that
common challenges facing most nonprofit boards include that: “often
non-profit board members have little or no preparation for board service
and do not understand what they should and should not do as a board
member.” 9 Of particular importance, “Today’s fast changing world
requires non-profit boards to assure the organization has an annually
updated strategic plan and succession plan.” 10
Dennis McCuistion is Clinical Professor of Corporate Governance at
the University of Texas at Dallas where he also serves as Executive
Director of the Institute for Excellence in Corporate Governance. He
heads the Institute’s conferences, in-house programs, and events. He is a
long-time member of the National Association of Corporate Directors
(NACD). He holds NACD’s Governance Fellow designation and is a
faculty member for the NACD’s Board Advisory Services. In addition to
his own financial consulting firm, McCuistion & Associates, Inc., he is a
former bank CEO, and has served on over a dozen private, public, and
not-for-profit boards, including serving as Chairman of the Board and
Lead Independent Director.
Professor McCuistion states that major challenges to nonprofits
include “that there are too many of them and consolidation is needed.
Additionally, boards are still uneducated as to what their real roles and
duties are ̶ so strategy is underdeveloped and succession of executive
directors and boards is inadequate. Consistent revenue streams, not just
annual ‘begs’ are also needed.” 11 When asked: what is different today
from nonprofit governance five years ago, professor McCuistion says “the
good news is that more director accountability is happening, more
nonprofits are changing from founders to true leaders, and there are more

9. See e-mail from Jack Lowe, Corp. Dir., to Lawrence J. Trautman (Feb. 21, 2018, 13:59
EST) (on file with authors).
10. Id.
11. See e-mail from Dennis McCuistion, Clinical Professor of Corp. Governance, University
of Texas at Dallas; Executive Dir., Institute for Excellence in Corporate Governance, to Lawrence J.
Trautman (Jan. 21, 2018, 11:24 EST) (on file with authors).
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metrics being used to truly measure results instead of just counting people
served for example.” 12
Deborah Cannon of Houston has served on at least sixteen nonprofit
boards including: United Way of Texas Gulf Coast, YMCA of Greater
Houston, Houston Technology Center, St. Luke’s Episcopal Health
Charities, and Irving Healthcare System. Some boards she has chaired
include: the Visiting Nurses Association, Greater Houston Partnership,
Women’s Business Enterprise National Council and Memorial Hermann
Health System. Ms. Cannon believes, “Major challenges include the need
to build consensus among the staff, most of whom work for nonprofits
because they believe in the mission. They are typically slower to realize
the need for change and require a lot of time and effort to build consensus
for actions needed.” 13
C.

No Money ̶ No Mission

For-profit organizations exist to sell a product or service, and their
revenue streams are often subject to a product life cycle. As demonstrated
vividly in Exhibit 1, except for enterprises that are fully financiallyendowed, nonprofit organizations differ in that their revenue stream is
dependent almost entirely upon donations. 14 Therefore, a major focus—if
not the major focus of almost every nonprofit enterprise—is the raising
and preservation of capital necessary to accomplish its stated mission.

12. Id.
13. See e-mail from Deborah Cannon, Corp. & Nonprofit Dir., to Lawrence J. Trautman (Jan.
26, 2018) (on file with authors).
14. See e.g., Peter Frumkin & Mark T. Kim, Strategic Positioning and the Financing of
Nonprofit Organizations: Is Efficiency Rewarded in the Contributions Marketplace?, Hauser Center
for Nonprofit Org. (Working Paper No. 2, 2000), https://ssrn.com/abstract=253115
[https://perma.cc/WF6D-PY52]; Peter Dobkin Hall, Philanthropy, the Welfare State, and the
Transformation of American Public and Private Institutions, 1945–2000, Hauser Center for Nonprofit
Org. (Working Paper No. 5, 2000), https://ssrn.com/abstract=262652 [https://perma.cc/9TFVXUN4]; Russell N. James, Cash Is Not King for Fundraising: Gifts of Noncash Assets Predict
Contributions
Growth,
29(5-6)
NONPROFIT
MGMT.
&
LEADERSHIP
(2018),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3126983 [https://perma.cc/47QZ-4YYB]; Michele Margolis & Michael
Sances, Who Really Gives? Partisanship and Charitable Giving in the United States (2013),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2148033 [https://perma.cc/LDH4-JS9X]; David E. Pozen, Remapping the
Charitable Deduction, 39 CONN. L. REV. 531 (2006); Norman I. Silber & Ely R. Levy, Nonprofit
Fundraising and Consumer Protection: A Donor’s Right to Privacy, 15 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 519
(2004); Reid K. Weisbord & Peter DeScioli, The Effects of Donor Standing on Philanthropy: Insights
from the Psychology of Gift-Giving, 45(2) GONZ. L. REV. 225 (2010); Xue Tan, Yingda Lu & Yong
Tan, Why Should I Donate? Examining the Effects of Reputation, Peer Influence, and Popularity on
Charitable Giving Over Social Media Platforms (2016), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2820219
[https://perma.cc/35KW-SLWG].
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Within the nonprofit universe, this revenue focus is often referred to as
capacity expansion. 15 After all, no money—no mission!
III. WHY GOOD GOVERNANCE IS IMPORTANT
A.

Fraud and Poor Governance at Nonprofits

Fraud is defined as “1. A knowing misrepresentation of the truth or
concealment of a material fact to induce another to act to his or her
detriment. . . . 2. A misrepresentation made recklessly without belief in its
truth to induce another person to act. 3. A tort . . . . 4. Unconscionable
dealing . . . .” 16 A 2006 study reports that “many people have potential
access to nonprofit revenues and assets since nine percent of all workers
are employed within the sector . . . and an estimated 65 million adults
provide volunteer services each year.” 17 Furthermore, “media reports
suggest the level of fraud might be extensive. For example, the FBI
reported that more than two thousand of the internet sites soliciting relief
for Hurricane Katrina victims were fraudulent.” 18 Professors Greenlee,
Fischer, Gordon and Keating offer the following examples of how fraud
often presents in a nonprofit setting:
•

Occupational fraud, e.g., a nonprofit employee overcharges his
or her employer for travel expenses or steals cash from the bank
account.

15. See e.g., Darrene Hackler & Gregory D. Saxton, The Strategic Use of Information
Technology by Nonprofit Organizations: Increasing Capacity and Untapped Potential, 67(3) Pub.
Admin. Rev. No. 3, 474-487 (2007), https://ssrn.com/abstract=1742466 [https://perma.cc/GN8YNJQW]; Elizabeth K. Keating, Mary Fischer, Teresa P. Gordon & Janet S. Greenlee, Assessing
Financial Vulnerability in the Nonprofit Sector, KSG Working Paper No. RWP05-002, Hauser Center
for Nonprofit Organizations Paper No. 27 (2005), https://ssrn.com/abstract=647662
[https://perma.cc/JFS4-35BY]; Claudio Travaglini, Financial Statement Analysis in Nonprofit
Organizations (2005), https://ssrn.com/abstract=1079380 [https://perma.cc/4KPG-5YDU]; Burton
A. Weisbrod, The Future of the Nonprofit Sector: Its Entwining with Private Enterprise and
Government, 16(4) J. POL’Y ANALS. & MGMT. 541 (1997), https://ssrn.com/abstract=1850797
[https://perma.cc/S2YL-L4ZB]; John Zietlow, A Financial Health Index for Achieving Nonprofit
Financial Sustainability (2012), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2049022[https://perma.cc/89HF-F2ET].
16. Fraud, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY ( 3d Pocket ed., 2006).
17. Janet Greenlee, Mary Fischer, Teresa Gordon & Elizabeth Keating, An Investigation of
Fraud in Nonprofit Organizations: Occurrences and Deterrents, Harv. U: Hauser Ctr. for Nonprofit
Organizations,
(Working
Paper
No.
35,
2006),
https://webworks.typepad.com/
lakecountyfiscalrangers/files/nonprofit_fraud_keating_35pgs.pdf [https://perma.cc/A9BB-XCU8].
18. Id. at 3.

https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol52/iss4/2

10

Trautman and Ford: Nonprofit Governance: The Basics

2018]

NONPROFIT GOVERNANCE: THE BASICS

•

Consumer fraud, e.g., an attendee at a fund raising auction
replaces the price tag on an item with the goal of purchasing it
at a lower price.

•

Insurance fraud, e.g., a nonprofit policy holder falsely claims
its van or car has been stolen with the goal of collecting the
value of the “stolen” vehicle in cash.

•

Medicare fraud, e.g. a nonprofit healthcare worker “codes”
services rendered with the goal of increasing Medicare
reimbursement to the organization. 19

981

Occupational fraud may be further dissected into “fraud against the
organization (such as the misappropriation of cash or other assets, or the
use of one’s position to benefit one’s self or others) and fraud by the
organization against its ‘owners’ or stakeholders (such as misstating
financial statements).” 20 Instances of fraud and reputational crisis among
nonprofits are legion. 21 Greenlee, Fischer, Gordon and Keating report that
a 2005 “survey conducted by the Association of Certified Fraud
Examiners (ACFE) estimates that all organizations lose on average six
percent of their revenue to fraud every year. Applying this percentage to
the nonprofit sector would suggest that the fraud loss would be
approximately $40 billion each year.” 22 Although nonprofits do not have
the imposed discipline of stringent reporting requirements such as those
imposed upon publicly held corporate securities issuers by the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC), directors of nonprofit organizations
still have the threat of individual, joint, and several legal liability for their
actions or failure to act. During October 2013, The Washington Post
reported their examination of nonprofit entity disclosures required on
federal forms about “whether [the nonprofit entity] had experienced an
embezzlement or other ‘diversion’ of its assets.” 23 This Washington Post
analysis of these disclosures covering the period 2008 to 2012 indicated
19. Id. at 5–6.
20. Id. at 6.
21. See Ann E. Marimow, Ex-chief of pathology nonprofit gets 4 years for stealing from
organization, WASH. POST (Jan. 29, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/exchief-of-pathology-nonprofit-gets-4-years-for-stealing-from-organization/2016/01/29/8888a530c6c0-11e5-a4aa-f25866ba0dc6_story.html?utm_term=.c2175f1743b4
[https://perma.cc/Z9WFWFER]; Valerie Strauss, Report: Millions of dollars in fraud, waste found in charter school sector,
WASH. POST (Apr. 28, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/answer-sheet/wp/2015/04/28/
report-millions-of-dollars-in-fraud-waste-found-in-charter-school-sector/?utm_term=.31d41aec7647
[https://perma.cc/6BXX-62CQ].
22. Greenlee, supra note 17 at 5.
23. See Stephens & Flaherty, supra note 4.
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“more than 1,000 nonprofit organizations . . . checked the box indicating
that they had discovered a ‘significant diversion’ of assets, disclosing
losses attributed to theft, investment fraud, embezzlement and other
unauthorized uses of funds.” 24 The Washington Post further observes:
Just 10 of the largest disclosures identified by The Post cited combined
losses to nonprofit groups and their affiliates that potentially totaled
more than a half-billion dollars.
While some of the diversions have come to public attention, many
others . . . have not been reported in the news media. And The Post
found that nonprofits routinely omitted important details from their
public filings, leaving the public to guess what had happened—even
though federal disclosure instructions direct nonprofit groups to explain
the circumstances. About half the organizations did not disclose the total
amount lost.
The findings are striking because organizations are required to report
only diversions of more than $250,000 or those identified as having
exceeded 5 percent of an organization’s annual gross receipts or total
assets. Of those, filing instructions direct nonprofits to disclose “any
unauthorized conversion or use of the organization’s assets other than
for the organization’s authorized purposes, including but not limited to
embezzlement or theft.” 25

The Washington Post provides the following list of nonprofit
embezzlements or other reported diversions of assets:

24.
25.

•

[The American Legacy Foundation] “became aware” of a
diversion “in excess of $250,000 committed by a former
employee.” . . . Records and interviews reveal the full story: an
estimated $3.4 million loss, linked to purchases from a business
described sometimes as a computer supply firm and at others
as a barbershop, and to an assistant vice president who now
runs a video game emporium in Nigeria.

•

[T]he nonprofit Youth Service America reported two years ago
that it discovered a diversion in 2009 of about $2 million that
had been “misappropriated” by a former employee. After The
Post asked about the incident, he was charged in federal court
and in June was sentenced to four years in prison for theft.

See Stephens & Flaherty, supra note 4.
See Stephens & Flaherty, supra note 4.
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•

AARP, the national charity that advocates for older
Americans . . . [in 2011] disclosed two incidents with losses
totaling more than $230,000, attributed to embezzlement and
billing irregularities.

•

[T]he Maryland Legal Aid Bureau . . . disclosed two years ago
that a former finance director and an accomplice had been
convicted of making off with $1.1 million; officials there said
in interviews they now think the total loss was closer to $2.5
million.

•

The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria,
based in Geneva but regulated and largely financed in the
United States, reported in 2012 that it had found evidence of
misuse or unsubstantiated spending of $43 million in grant
funds.

•

The Conference on Jewish Material Claims Against Germany,
a New York-based charity for Holocaust survivors, reported in
2010 that it had been bilked out of $42 million in an elaborate,
decade-long conspiracy by swindlers who created thousands of
fake identities. A spokesman said the estimate has since been
raised to $60 million. 26

983

The following are just a few examples of sub-standard nonprofit
governance to make our point.
B.

Toronto Salvation Army

Professor Richard Leblanc reports that the executive director at the
Toronto Salvation Army operation is alleged to have been involved in a
“massive theft of $2M in children’s toys . . . [which] likely involved
inadequate internal controls over the segregation of duties, over the
safeguarding of assets, and over restricted areas. Perhaps paper rather than
IT controls were being used (still not uncommon), which is more capable
of manual override.” 27 Professor Leblanc continues:
It is unclear, judging from the Salvation Army website, whether the
Governing Council of the Salvation Army has adequate independence
from management or financial expertise. . . . There is an advisory board,
26.
27.

See Stephens & Flaherty, supra note 4.
Richard Leblanc, Governance at the Salvation Army, DR. RICHARD LEBLANC
GOVERNANCE BLOG: EMERGENT DEVELOPMENTS AND COMMENTARY ON GOVERNANCE AND
ACCOUNTABILITY (Nov. 27, 2012), http://rleblanc.apps01.yorku.ca/governance-at-the-salvationarmy/ [https://perma.cc/F95L-GBJB].
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but there is no indication that the Salvation Army has a proper,
functioning board of directors, that oversees risk and controls. Advisory
committees advise, but cannot direct. 28

C.

Penn State Sex Abuse Scandal

Years after a scathing report was issued by Special Investigative
Counsel Louis Freeh regarding “the culpability of Pennsylvania State
University administrators in the Jerry Sandusky child-molestation
scandal,” the issue is still in the news. 29 Following guilty pleas to child
endangerment charges by Penn State’s former athletic director and a
university senior vice president, and just hours after Graham B. Spanier,
former Penn State president, was convicted of one count of misdemeanor
endangering the welfare of children, Mr. Freeh observed:
For over 12 years, these men actively protected a notorious pedophile
who inflicted irreparable harm on countless child victims on the
campuses and locker rooms at PSU . . . Although these men had
multiple opportunities to stop this vicious, serial predator from
continuing to sexually assault children who trusted the PSU campuses
and programs as safe havens, they decided together to protect this
monster rather than report him to the police. . . .
Barron and a coterie of ‘Paterno denier’ board members, alumni, cultlike
groups such as Penn Staters for Responsible Stewardship, a former
professional football player, and certain elected state political hacks
have been nothing but apologists for Paterno, Spanier, Schultz, and
Curley, more concerned about bringing back a bronze statue than
worrying about the multiple child victims who have forever been so
grievously harmed on the PSU campus. 30

1. Background
The 267-page Report dated July 12, 2012 by the Investigative
Counsel of law firm Freeh, Sporkin & Sullivan, LLP is a must read for all
those considering nonprofit directorship. 31 Because of the many important

28. Id.
29. Don Troop, Louis Freeh Savages Penn State’s Leaders and Calls for Its President to
Resign, CHRONS. HIGHER EDUC. (2017), https://www.chronicle.com/blogs/ticker/louis-freehsavages-penn-states-leaders-and-calls-for-its-president-to-resign/117422 [https://perma.cc/W9TFFDD].
30. Id.
31. See Report of the Special Investigative Counsel Regarding the Actions of The Pennsylvania
State University Related to the Child Sexual Abuse Committed by Gerald A. Sandusky, Freeh Sporkin
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governance lessons this tragedy teaches, we offer the following excerpts
from the Report’s Executive Summary for serious thought and reflection:
On November 4, 2011 the Attorney General of the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania (“Attorney General”) filed criminal charges against
Gerald A. Sandusky (“Sandusky”) that included multiple counts of
involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, aggravated indecent assault,
corruption of minors, unlawful contact with minors and endangering the
welfare of minors. Several of the offenses occurred between 1998 and
2002, during which time Sandusky was either the Defensive Coordinator
for The Pennsylvania State University . . . football team or a Penn State
professor Emeritus with unrestricted access to the University’s football
facilities. On November 4, 2011, the Attorney General filed criminal
charges against the University’s Athletic Director (“AD”) Timothy M.
Curley (“Curley”) and Senior Vice President Finance and Business
(“SVP-FB”), Gary C. Schultz (“Schultz”) for failing to report
allegations of child abuse against Sandusky to law enforcement or child
protection authorities in [2001] and for committing perjury during their
testimony about the allegations to the Grand Jury in Dauphin County,
Pennsylvania, in January 2011.
On June 22, 2012, a Centre County jury in Bellefonte, Pennsylvania
found Sandusky guilty of 45 counts of the criminal charges against him.
As of the date of this report, the charges against Curley and Schultz have
not been heard by the court.
The criminal charges filed against these highly respected University and
community leaders are unprecedented in the history of the University.
Several senior University leaders who had knowledge of the allegations
did not prepare for the possibility that these criminal charges would be
filed. In the days and weeks surrounding the announcement of the
charges, University leaders . . . and the University’s Board of Trustees
(“Board” or “Trustees”), struggled to decide what actions the University
should take and how to be appropriately transparent about their actions.
The high degree of interest exhibited by members of the University
community, alumni, the public and the national media put additional
pressure on these leaders to act quickly. 32

2. Findings
The findings from the Report of the Sandusky Special Investigative
Counsel constitute an important case study in governance failure. While
& Sullivan, LLP (July 12, 2012), https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/396518/freeh-reportinto-penn-state-university.pdf [https://perma.cc/EBP3-DZTD].
32. Id.
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reading and reflecting upon the entire document is highly recommended,
space limitations confine us here to a brief synopsis:
The most saddening finding by the Special Investigative Counsel is the
total and consistent disregard by the most senior leaders at Penn State
for the safety and welfare of Sandusky’s child victims. As the Grand
Jury similarly noted in its presentment, there was no “attempt to
investigate, to identify Victim 2, or to protect that child or any others
from similar conduct except as related to preventing its re-occurrence on
University property.”
Four of the most powerful people at The Pennsylvania State
University—President Graham B. Spanier, Senior Vice PresidentFinance and Business Gary C. Schultz, Athletic Director Timothy M.
Curley and Head Football Coach Joseph V. Paterno—failed to protect
against a child sexual predator harming children for over a decade.
These men concealed Sandusky’s activities from the Board of Trustees,
the University community and authorities. They exhibited a striking lack
of empathy for Sandusky’s victims by failing to inquire as to their safety
and well-being, especially by not attempting to determine the identity of
the child who Sandusky assaulted in the Lasch building in 2001. Further,
they exposed this child to additional harm by alerting Sandusky, who
was the only one who knew the child’s identity, of what McQueary saw
in the shower on the night of February 9, 2001.
These individuals, unchecked by the Board of Trustees that did not
perform its oversight duties, empowered Sandusky to attract potential
victims to the campus and football events by allowing him to have
continued, unrestricted and unsupervised access to the University’s
facilities and affiliation with the University’s prominent football
program. Indeed, that continued access provided Sandusky with the very
currency that enabled him to attract his victims. Some coaches,
administrators and football program staff members ignored the red flags
of Sandusky’s behaviors and no one warned the public about him.
By not promptly and fully advising the Board of Trustees about the 1998
and 2001 child sexual abuse allegations against Sandusky and the
subsequent Grand Jury investigation of him, Spanier failed in his duties
as President. The Board also failed in its duties to oversee the President
and senior University officials in 1998 and 2001 by not inquiring about
important University matters and by not creating an environment where
senior University officials felt accountable.
Once the Board was made aware of the investigations of Sandusky and
the fact that senior University officials had testified before the Grand
Jury in the investigations, it should have recognized the potential risk to
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the University community and to the University’s reputation. Instead,
the Board, as a governing body, failed to inquire reasonably and to
demand detailed information from Spanier. The Board’s overconfidence
in Spanier’s abilities to deal with the crisis, and its complacent attitude
left them unprepared to respond to the November 2011 criminal charges
filed against two senior Penn State leaders and a former prominent
coach. Finally, the Board’s subsequent removal of Paterno as head
football coach was poorly handled, as were the Board’s communications
with the public. . . [T]he Special Investigative Counsel finds that it is
more reasonable to conclude that, in order to avoid the consequences of
bad publicity, the most powerful leaders at the University—Spanier,
Schultz, Paterno and Curley—repeatedly concealed critical facts
relating to Sandusky’s child abuse from the authorities, the University’s
Board of Trustees, the Penn State community, and the public at large.
The avoidance of the consequences of bad publicity is the most
significant, but not the only, cause for this failure to protect child victims
and report to authorities. The investigation also revealed:
•

A striking lack of empathy for child abuse victims by the most
senior leaders of the University.

•

A failure by the Board to exercise its oversight functions in
1998 and 2001 by not having regular reporting procedures or
committee structures in place to ensure disclosure to the Board
of major risks to the University.

•

A failure by the Board to make reasonable inquiry in 2011 by
not demanding details from Spanier and the General Counsel
about the nature and direction of the grand jury investigation
and the University’s response to the investigation.

•

A President who discouraged discussion and dissent.

•

A lack of awareness of child abuse issues, the Clery Act, and
whistleblower policies and protections. 33

3. Alarming Prevalence of Sexual Assault
Other examples of widespread sexual abuse, assault, and sexual
harassment are reported seemingly daily. 34 For example, press reports
33. Id. (emphasis added).
34. See Melissa Korn, Academia Faces a #MeToo Moment, WALL ST. J., (Jan. 12, 2018), at
A3 (college campuses); Ryan Dube & Francis X. Rocca, Clerical Sex-Abuse Scandal Follows Pope,
WALL ST. J., (Jan. 16, 2018), at A16 (Catholic church); Blake Ellis & Melanie Hicken, Sick, Dying
and Raped in America’s Nursing Homes, CNN (2017), http://www.cnn.com/
interactive/2017/02/health/nursing-home-sex-abuse-investigation/
[https://perma.cc/6Z4R-VJN6]
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abound describing the sentencing of Dr. Larry Nassar to up to 175 years
in prison for the sexual abuse of hundreds of young girls engaged in the
USA Gymnastics program. 35 Michigan State University president Lou
Anna K. Simon states, “The survivor’s accounts are horrific. They are
tragic, heartbreaking and personally gut-wrenching.” 36 She resigned amid
criticism of the failure of the university over many years to follow-up
reports of sexual assault. 37 Scandals such as these cause reputational
damage with resulting economic consequences lasting many years. 38
D.

New York United Way

In the nonprofit world, one of the most notorious examples of lack
of effective governance is found in the example of the New York United
Way, where William Aramony, president of United Way of America from
1970 to 1992, “spent six years in a federal prison after he was convicted
in 1995 on 23 counts of felony charges, including conspiracy, fraud and
filing false tax returns.” 39 The Washington Post reports:

(nursing homes); Lawrence J. Trautman, Kenneth J. Sanney, Eric D. Yordy, Tammy W. Cowart, and
Destynie Sewell, Beginning To Think About Ethics and Values in an Age of Rapid Technological
Change, http://ssrn.com/abstract=3102552 [https://perma.cc/GU9L-QL4C]. (Stanford University
rape case).
35. See Louise Radnofsky, U.S. Gymnastics Star Says She Too Was Assaulted by Doctor,
WALL ST. J., (Jan. 16, 2018), at A3; Monica Davey & Mitch Smith, Michigan State’s Defender Led
Review of Abuse, N.Y. TIMES, (Jan. 28, 2018), at A1; Rebecca Davis O’Brien, USOC Failed to Act
on Reports of Abuse, WALL ST. J., (Feb. 2, 2018), at A3; Louise Radnofsky, Senators Want Olympics
Chief to Resign, WALL ST. J., (Feb. 3–4, 2018), at A3; Rebecca Davis O’Brien, Investigation Is Called
for Training Site, WALL ST. J., (Jan. 31, 2018), at A3.
36. See Lou Anna K. Simon, President Simon Announces Resignation from MSU, MICH. ST.
U. (Jan.
24,
2018),
https://cabs.msu.edu/news/key-issues/issue-docs/simon-resigns.html
[https://perma.cc/7TJJ-PHMY].
37. See Dan Barry, Serge F. Kovaleski & Juliet Macur, As F.B.I. Took a Year to Pursue the
Nassar Case, Dozens Say They Were Molested, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 3, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/03/sports/nassar-fbi.html
[https://perma.cc/A5JJ-WTE3];
Matthew Haag & Marc Tracy, Michigan State President Lou Anna Simon Resigns Amid Nassar
TIMES
(Jan.
24,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/24/
Fallout,
N.Y.
sports/olympics/michigan-state-president-resigns-lou-anna-simon.html
[https://perma.cc/4Y3C3JCX]; Christine Hauser & Maggie Astor, The Larry Nassar Case: What Happened and How the
Fallout Is Spreading, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 25, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/25/sports/larrynassar-gymnastics-abuse.html [https://perma.cc/QA8B-BKDJ].
38. See Michael Luca, Patrick Rooney & Jonathan Smith, The Impact of Campus Scandals on
College Applications, HARV. BUS. SCH. (2016), http://www.people.hbs.edu/mluca/
CollegeScandals.pdf [https://perma.cc/73RS-Y849].
39. See T. Rees Shapiro, United Way leader’s fraud scandal marred charitable legacy, WASH.
POST, (Nov. 14, 2011), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/obituaries/united-way-leaders-fraudscandal-marred-charitable-legacy/2011/11/14/gIQALnwbMN_story.html?utm_term=.7c63a5c0edfc
[https://perma.cc/35HH-K939].
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Revelations that he used United Way funds to pay for extramarital
affairs—including a dalliance he began with a teenager soon after she
graduated high school—embarrassed one of the nation’s most respected
charities. His actions moved scores of charitable organizations to review
their business practices.

...
•

As president, Mr. Aramony helped United Way annual
donations grow to more than $3 billion in 1990 from $787
million in 1970 . . .

...
•

Mr. Aramony was one of the highest-paid executives in the
charity field, earning an annual compensation package of more
than $460,000. Yet, as federal prosecutors charged, he used
United Way money to support a luxurious lifestyle that
included craps games in Las Vegas, frequenting velvet-rope
dance clubs and eating lobster dinners in tony restaurants.
...

•

He used United Way of America spinoff companies to buy and
decorate a $430,000 apartment in New York’s Upper East Side
and purchase a $125,000 condominium in Miami. . . .
...

E.

•

Mr. Aramony used United Way money to take vacations with
[a 17 year old] and his other mistresses to Paris, London and
Cairo. . . .

•

Mr. Aramony resigned from United Way of America in
February 1992, after The Post stories were published.

•

During Mr. Aramony’s 1995 trial, four of his former lovers
testified against him. In his defense, Mr. Aramony’s lawyers
noted that a few weeks before he left United Way, board
members gave him a unanimous vote of confidence.
Ultimately, his lawyers called no witnesses. He was sentenced
to seven years in a federal penitentiary. 40

Bernie Madoff Investment Scam

New Yorker Bernard Madoff is credited with one of the biggest ever
investment frauds when he “[plead] guilty to eleven federal felony charges
40.
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and admitted that his wealth management business was nothing but a shell
for running a Ponzi scheme.” 41 For more than two decades “he ran a $60
billion-dollar Ponzi scheme . . . causing thousands of investors to lose
large sums, in many instances their life savings. Because thousands of
victims lost money to Madoff’s fraud, the prosecutors developed a
website to provide information about the case to the victims.” 42 Professors
Cassell and Erez observe, “More than one hundred wrote letters or emails
to the presiding judge in the case, Judge Danny Chin. During Madoff’s
sentencing hearing, ten victims spoke: eight of whom had also submitted
written statements and two of whom had not.” 43
Among the victims, The Washington Post reports that “the Alliance
for Excellent Education . . . disclosed . . . that investment manager
Bernard L. Madoff’s Ponzi scheme had wiped nearly $7 million from its
balance sheets.” 44 Investigative efforts from The Washington Post
discloses that among nonprofits, “Investment fraud was blamed for some
of the largest losses identified. Funds linked to Madoff’s scheme, which
bilked investors across the country for decades, reportedly drained $106
million from Yeshiva University . . . $38.8 million from the Upstate New
York Engineers Health Fund and $26 million from New York
University.” 45
F.

FIFA Fraud and Corruption

Internationally, the governing body of the most popular sport in the
world has suffered embarrassment, humiliation, widespread bribery and
corruption, convictions, and jail time. 46 The April 2016 release of The

41. United States v. Madoff (No. 1:09-cr-00213 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (April 20, 2009). See also
Kaushik Basu, Ponzis: The Science and Mystique of a Class of Financial Frauds, World Bank Group,
Off.
Chief
Econ.,
3
Policy
Research
Working
Paper
No.
6967),
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/660611468148791146/pdf/WPS6967.pdf
[https://perma.cc/48GB-HCGT ]; Stephen G. Dimmock & William C. Gerken, Finding Bernie
Madoff: Detecting Fraud by Investment Managers, http://ssrn.com/abstract=1471631
[https://perma.cc/VT3Q-2VNB]; Miriam A. Cherry, Review Essay: Learning Contracts Through
Current Events: Lawrence Cunningham’s Contracts in the Real World, Stories of Popular Contracts
and Why They Matter, 35 U. HAW. L. REV. 129 (2013); Garima Rai, The Vulnerability to fraud:
Factors, Motivations, and fraud detection and Deterrence, (April 19, 2017),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2962613 [https://perma.cc/S6KY-EX7G ].
42. See Paul G. Cassell & Edna Erez, Victim Impact Statements and Ancillary Harm: The
American Perspective, 15 CANADIAN CRIM. L. REV. 149 (2011).
43. Id.
44. See Stephens & Flaherty, supra note 4.
45. See Stephens & Flaherty, supra note 4.
46. See Lawrence J. Trautman, Following the Money: Lessons from the “Panama Papers,”
Part 1: Tip of the Iceberg, 121 PENN ST. L. REV. 807, 807 (2017).
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Panama Papers is the largest to date release of documents resulting from
the year-long effort by over 400 journalists worldwide and “the
International Consortium of Investigative Journalists [ICIJ] to expose a
global pattern of crime and corruption.” 47 As Trautman describes
elsewhere:
After release of the Panama papers, “Swiss authorities raided the
headquarters of the European soccer association in Nyon,
Switzerland . . . seizing information on television rights contracts with
Argentine business executives implicated in the FIFA corruption
scandal.” The New York Times article further reported that “FIFA’s
independent ethics committee confirmed that one of its ethics lawyers
was under internal investigation for a business relationship brought to
light by the Panama Papers.”
On May 27, 2015, a 47-count indictment was unsealed by the United
States Department of Justice in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of New York. Fourteen defendants were charged in this
indictment with “racketeering, wire fraud and money laundering
conspiracies, among other offenses, in connection with the defendants’
participation in a 24-year scheme to enrich themselves through the
corruption of international soccer.” On the same day, coordinated raids
were held by “United States and Swiss officials on FIFA facilities in
Miami and at FIFA headquarters in Zurich. Swiss authorities also
conducted an early morning raid on Zurich’s luxury Baur du Lac Hotel
arresting seven FIFA officials.”
Known as soccer in the United States, “international football is the
world’s most popular sport. It is played in every country, territory, and
remote island on the planet . . . requiring no elaborate infrastructure, no
expensive equipment, and no extraordinary physical characteristics for
those who simply want to kick a ball toward a goal . . . .”
According to the DOJ, FIFA is composed of 209 member associations,
each representing organized soccer in a particular nation or territory,
including the United States and four of its overseas territories. FIFA also
recognizes six continental confederations that assist it in governing
soccer in different regions of the world. The U.S. Soccer Federation is
one of 41 member associations of the confederation known as
CONCACAF, which has been headquartered in the United States
throughout the period charged in the indictment. The South American
confederation, called CONMEBOL, is also a focus of the indictment.

47.
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As alleged in the indictment, FIFA and its six continental
confederations, together with affiliated regional federations, national
member associations and sports marketing companies, constitute an
enterprise of legal entities associated in fact for purposes of the federal
racketeering laws. The principal—and entirely legitimate—purpose of
the enterprise is to regulate and promote the sport of soccer worldwide.
As alleged in the indictment, one key way the enterprise derives revenue
is to commercialize the media and marketing rights associated with
soccer events and tournaments. The organizing entity that owns those
rights—as FIFA and CONCACAF do with respect to the World Cup and
Gold Cup, their respective flagship tournaments—sells them to sports
marketing companies, often through multi-year contracts covering
multiple editions of the tournaments. The sports marketing companies,
in turn, sell the rights downstream to TV and radio broadcast networks,
major corporate sponsors and other sub-licensees who want to broadcast
the matches or promote their brands. The revenue generated from these
contracts is substantial: according to FIFA, 70% of its $5.7 billion in
total revenues between 2011 and 2014 was attributable to the sale of TV
and marketing rights to the 2014 World Cup. 48

G.

Beware of Foreign Operations

On August 29, 2017, the DOJ filed a criminal complaint against
Joseph Baptiste, a founder of a nonprofit intended to assist the poor in
Haiti, and also a retired U.S. Army colonel. He was charged in a criminal
complaint, “stemming from his alleged role in a corruption scheme
connected to a Haitian development project.” 49 According to Gibson
Dunn:
Unbeknownst to Baptiste, the project’s investors who provided him the
bribe money were undercover FBI agents. Unbeknownst to the
undercover FBI agents, Baptiste used the $50,000 down payment on a
bribe for his own personal expenses. DOJ alleges that there was an
FCPA violation because Baptiste allegedly intended to use additional
payments for actual bribery of Haitian port officials. Baptiste reportedly
entered into a signed plea agreement with DOJ after being approached
by authorities and before the charges were made public, but then backed
out of that deal, leading to his arrest. 50

48. Id. 823–25 (citations omitted).
49. See 2017 Year-End FCPA Update, GIBSON DUNN 12 (Jan. 2,
https://www.gibsondunn.com/2017-year-end-fcpa-update/ [https://perma.cc/5KGG-5KAL].
50. Id.
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It appears that bribery and corruption minefields are everywhere, as
demonstrated during 2017 by revelations “concern[ing] a new branch of
corruption at the United Nations.” 51 John Ashe, former President of the
U.N. General Assembly, has been implicated in “a scheme to corruptly
influence a plan to build a U.N.-sponsored conference center in
Macau. . . . On November 20, 2017, DOJ unsealed a criminal complaint
alleging a completely distinct bribery scheme involving Ashe’s successor
to the U.N. General Assembly presidency.” 52 Gibson Dunn reports:
Chi Ping Patrick Ho, the head of a non-governmental organization that
holds “special consultative status” at the United Nations and is
associated with the China Energy Fund, and Cheikh Gadio, the former
Foreign Minister of Senegal and a business consultant, were each
charged with substantive and conspiracy FCPA and money laundering
violations associated with two separate bribery schemes. The first
involved an alleged scheme to pay $2 million to the President of Chad
to secure valuable oil concessions and reduce a substantial fine for
environmental violations by Ho’s Chinese employer. The second
scheme, allegedly “hatched in the hallways of the United Nations,”
involved a separate plan to bribe the current Foreign Minister of Uganda
and then-President of the U.N. General Assembly with $500,000 for
various illicit benefits, including a share in profits from a Ugandan joint
venture with Ho’s Chinese employer. . . . Neither individual has yet
(publicly) entered a plea in connection with these charges. 53

IV. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE REQUIREMENTS
As we have seen in Exhibit 1, the largest U.S. charities are
substantially donor dependent and therefore reliant upon the motivation
of contributor tax deductions for the bulk of their revenues. Federal law,
in what is commonly referred to by the shorthand expression section 501,
provides for tax-exempt status for certain entities, 54 and also provides that
contributions to tax-exempt entities are tax deductible for the donors. 55
51. Id. at 13.
52. Id.; see also Lawrence J. Trautman, U.S. Entrepreneurial Risk in International Markets:
Focus on Bribery and Corruption, (Feb. 6, 2017) (unpublished manuscripts) (on file with authors),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2912072 [https://perma.cc/MSE4-HQMV]; Lawrence J. Trautman & Kara
Altenbaumer-Price, Lawyers, Guns and Money – The Bribery Problem and U.K. Bribery Act, 47 INT’L
L. 481 (2013); Lawrence J. Trautman & Kara Altenbaumer-Price, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: An
Update on Enforcement and SEC and DOJ Guidance, 41 SEC. REG. L.J. 241 (2013); Joanna Kimbell
& Lawrence J. Trautman, Bribery and Corruption: The COSO Framework, FCPA, and U.K. Bribery
Act, 30(3) FLA. J. INT’L L. (2019).
53. See 2017 Year-End FCPA Update, supra note 50, at 13(emphasis in original).
54. I.R.C. §501(a) (West 2017).
55. I.R.C. §170 (West 2019).
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Accordingly, nonprofit governance must be conducted with an
understanding of and strict compliance with Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) regulations that govern tax deductibility of donations. Such
awareness and focus is paramount to the health, wellbeing, and survival
of nonprofit organizations.
Nonprofit organizations, like their for-profit counterparts, are subject
to a variety of state and federal laws and must comply with applicable
laws at both levels in order to maintain their tax-exempt status and thus
the tax deductibility of contributions by donors. As noted by the IRS,
“[n]onprofit status is a state law concept. . . . [O]rganizing as a nonprofit
organization at the state level does not automatically grant the
organization exemption from federal income tax.” 56 A nonprofit
organization begins its existence under state law by filing the necessary
documents with and submitting the required fees to the appropriate state
office, typically the Secretary of State. In order to obtain tax-exempt status
from the IRS, the nonprofit entity must include in its charter a purposes
provision and a dissolution provision. The purposes provision ensures that
the organization will pursue activities and objectives that fall within the
exemption requirements of section 501, and the dissolution provision
ensures that, upon dissolution of the organization, its assets will be
distributed either for another exempt purpose under section 501(c) or to
the federal, state, or local government. 57
Once the nonprofit entity has been established under state law, it may
then apply to the IRS for tax-exempt status. The organization must obtain
a federal Employer Identification Number (EIN) regardless of whether it
has employees. The EIN serves as an identifier for the organization in its
interactions with the IRS in much the same way that a Social Security
Number identifies individual taxpayers. 58 In addition to the application
itself (Form 1023 or Form 1023 EZ), the IRS requires copies of the
organization’s state charter and a filing fee. If the IRS reviewer finds that
the organization’s application is complete and meets all requirements for
tax-exempt status, the IRS will issue a determination letter or ruling
granting tax-exempt status. 59
56. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, Frequently Asked Questions about Applying for Tax
Exemption, https://www.irs.gov/charities-non-profits/frequently-asked-questions-about-applyingfor-tax-exemption [https://perma.cc/3424-HE9M].
57. 26 C.F.R §1.501(c)(3)-1 (West 2017).
58. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, Employee Identification Number, https://www.irs.gov/
charities-non-profits/employer-identification-number [https://perma.cc/3BY3-ENU4].
59. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, Exempt Organizations – Rulings and Determinations
Letters,
https://www.irs.gov/charities-non-profits/charitable-organizations/exempt-organizationsrulings-and-determinations-letters [https://perma.cc/DCM8-8J9S].
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While the application process for tax-exempt status may seem
straightforward, the interim period between the creation of the nonprofit
entity under state law and the granting of tax-exempt status by the IRS
poses some practical concerns that must be addressed by the governing
board of the nonprofit. Perhaps the primary concern is whether or to what
extent contributions made to the organization during this interim period
are tax deductible. The answer is: It depends. If the organization files a
timely application and the IRS grants tax-exempt status, then its taxexempt status dates back to the date of its organization and contributions
received during that interim period are tax deductible. However, if taxexempt status is denied, then those contributions are not tax deductible. 60
This begs the question: what is a timely application? Under current IRS
policy, a nonprofit entity’s tax-exempt status will be retroactive to the date
on which it was organized if its application was filed within 27 months
from the end of the month in which it was organized. If the application is
filed after that 27-month window, then tax-exempt status, and thus the taxdeductibility of contributions, will be retroactive only to the date of the
application’s receipt, defined as either the postmark date on the cover of
the application or the date that is stamped on the application when it is
actually received by the IRS. 61
The interim period between a nonprofit’s organization and its receipt
of tax-exempt status from the IRS is also a period that requires careful
recordkeeping and reporting, as well as oversight of the organization’s
activities to ensure that it does not jeopardize its pending tax-exempt
status. Most nonprofit organizations, with some exceptions, are required
to file annual exempt organization returns (Form 990 or one of its
variants) with the IRS, even while their application for tax-exempt status
is pending. 62 Filing Form 990 late, filing an incomplete return, or failing
to file at all will trigger penalties unless the organization can show
reasonable cause for the failure to properly file. Importantly for all taxexempt organizations, failure to file a Form 990 for three consecutive
years will trigger an automatic revocation of tax-exempt status. 63
Once tax-exempt status has been granted by the IRS, a nonprofit
organization must protect this status through required filings, such as the

60. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, Contributions to Organization with IRS Application
Pending,
https://www.irs.gov/charities-non-profits/charitable-organizations/contributions-toorganization-with-irs-application-pending [https://perma.cc/M3AL-GZ6S].
61. Tax Exempt Status for Your Organization, I.R.S. Pub. No. 557, Cat. No. 46573C, at 22
(Jan. 30, 2017), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p557.pdf [https://perma.cc/W47R-RE65].
62. I.R.C. §6033 (West Mar. 23, 2018).
63. I.R.C. §6033(j) (West Mar. 23, 2018).

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2019

25

Akron Law Review, Vol. 52 [2019], Iss. 4, Art. 2

996

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[52:971

Form 990 discussed above, along with any additional information
required by the federal or state government. While Form 990 or one of its
variants, Form 990-EZ or Form 990-N (the e-postcard), is used by most
nonprofit tax-exempt organizations, there are special forms for certain
categories of nonprofits, such as Form 1065 for religious organizations or
Form 5500 for employee benefit trusts. 64 In addition to information
concerning revenue and disbursements, Forms 990 and 990-EZ also
require a brief summary of the organization’s activities and
accomplishments for the reporting period. Form 990 and Form 990-EZ
also require disclosure of the organization’s governance structure and
practices. The three most recent annual exemption returns filed by taxexempt organizations are required to be available for public inspection. 65
In addition to annual filings required under the Internal Revenue
Code, many states also require annual financial statements to be filed or
made available to the public as well.66 As with for-profit entities, state
laws typically require that a nonprofit’s leadership meet regularly and
maintain minutes of actions taken. 67 Many states require that a nonprofit

64. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, Exempt Organizations Annual Reporting Requirements –
Overview – Annual Return Filing Exceptions, https://www.irs.gov/charities-non-profits/exemptorganizations-annual-reporting-requirements-overview-annual-return-filing-exceptions
[https://perma.cc/A4K8-R4FP ].
65. I.R.C. §6104(d) (West Dec. 19, 2014).
66. See, e.g. ARK. CODE ANN. §4-28-403 (2018); MASS. GEN. LAWS CH. 12, §8F (2017); N.C.
GEN. STAT. §55A-16-24 (2018); OR. REV. STAT. §128.670 (2017); TEX. BUS. ORG. CODE ANN.
§22.353 (2017).
67. See, e.g. ALA. CODE §§10A-2.13, 2.32 (2018); ALASKA STAT. §§10.20.116, 131 (2018);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§10.3820, 11601 (2018); ARK. CODE ANN. §4-28-218 (2018); CAL. CORP.
CODE §6320 (WEST 2018); COLO. REV. STAT. §§7-128-201, 136-101(2018); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§331095, 1235 (2018); DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 8, §224 (2018); D.C. CODE §§29-406.20, 413.01 (2018);
FLA. STAT. §§617.0820,1601 (2018); GA. CODE ANN. §§14-3-820, 1601 (2018); HAW. REV. STAT.
§§414D-143, 301 (2018); IDAHO CODE §§30-6-1101, 30-612 (2018); ILL. COMP. STAT. 805 ILCS 105/
§§107.75, 108.20 (2018); IND. CODE §§23-17-15-1,27-1 (2018); IOWA CODE §§504.821, 1601 (2019);
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§273.223, 233 (2018); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§17-6301, 6514 (2018); LA. STAT.
ANN. §§12:223, 224 (2018); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. TIT. 13-B, §§705, 715 (2018); MD. CODE ANN.,
CORP. & ASS’N., §2-409 (LEXISNEXIS 2018); MASS. GEN. LAWS CH. 156B, §§32, 56 (2017); MICH.
COMP. LAWS §§450.2485, 2521 (2017); MINN. STAT. §§317A.231, 461 (2018); MISS. CODE ANN.
§§79-11-255, 283 (2018); MO. REV. STAT. §§355.376, 821 (2018); MONT. CODE ANN. §§35-2-427,
906 (2017); NEB. REV. STAT. §§21-1980, 19165 (2018); NEV. REV. STAT. §§82.181, 266 (2018); N.J.
STAT. ANN. §§15A:5-24, 6-10 (2018); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§53-8-22, 27(2018); N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT
CORP. LAW §§621, 710 (2018); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§55A-8-20, 16-01 (2018); N.D. CENT. CODE §§1033-39, 80 (2018); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§1702.15, 31 (2018); OKLA. STAT. TIT. 18, §§1027, 1069
(2017); OR. REV. STAT. §§65.337, 771 (2017); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. §§1508, 1703 (2018); 7 R.I. GEN.
LAWS §§7-6-27, 30 (2018); S.C. CODE ANN. §§33-31-820, 1601 (2018); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§4723-21, 24-1 (2018); TENN. CODE ANN. §§48-58-201, 66-101 (2018); TEX. BUS. ORG. CODE ANN.
§§22.220, 351 (2017); UTAH CODE ANN. §§16-6A-812, 1601 (2018); VT. STAT. ANN. TIT. 11B,
§§8.20, 16.01 (2018); VA. CODE ANN. §§13.1-864, 932 (2018); WASH. REV. CODE §§24.03.120, 135
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organization register with or obtain a license from the state prior to
soliciting contributions from their citizens. 68 A nonprofit organization that
fails to comply with state recordkeeping and reporting requirements may
be administratively dissolved by the Secretary of State or other official69
or judicially dissolved by a court of competent jurisdiction. 70
The governing body of a nonprofit organization may also jeopardize
its tax-exempt status by allowing that organization to engage in forbidden
activity or forbidden transactions. Section 501 of the Internal Revenue
Code, through its many sub-sections, provides the opportunity for a wide
variety of organizations to be granted tax-exempt status. 71 The common
(2018); W. VA. CODE §§31E-8-820, 15-1501 (2018); WIS. STAT. §§181.0820, 1601 (2019); WYO.
STAT. ANN. §§17-19-820, 1601 (2018).
68. See, e.g. ALA. CODE §13A-9-71 (2018); ALASKA STAT. §45.68.010 (2018); ARK. CODE
ANN. §4-28-402 (2018); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §17510.3 (WEST 2018); COLO. REV. STAT. §6-16104 (2018); CONN. GEN. STAT. §21A-190B (2018); D.C. CODE §44-1703 (2018); FLA. STAT. §496.405
(2018); GA. CODE ANN. §43-17-3.1 (2018); HAW. REV. STAT. §467B-2.1 (2018); IDAHO CODE §481004 (2018); ILL. COMP. STAT. 225 ILCS 460/ §2 (2018); KAN. STAT. ANN. §17-1761 (2018); KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. §367.657 (2018); LA. STAT. ANN. § 51:1901.1 (2018); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. TIT. 9,
§ 5004 (2018); MD. CODE ANN., BUS. REG. §6-401 (LEXISNEXIS 2018); MASS. GEN. LAWS CH. 12,
§8E (2017); MICH. COMP. LAWS §400.273 (2017); MINN. STAT. §309.52 (2018); MISS. CODE ANN.
§79-11-503 (2018); MO. REV. STAT. § 355.456 (2018); NEV. REV. STAT. §82A.100 (2018); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. §7:28-B (2018); N.J. STAT. ANN. §45:17A-23 (2018); N.M. STAT. ANN. §57-22-6 (2018);
N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW §115 (2018); N.C. GEN. STAT. §131F-5 (2018); N.D. CENT. CODE
§50-22-02 (2018); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §1716.02 (2018); OKLA. STAT. TIT. 18, §552.3 (2017); OR.
REV. STAT. §65.337 (2017); 10 PA. CONS. STAT. §162.5 (2018); 5 R.I. GEN. LAWS §5-53.1-2 (2018);
S.C. CODE ANN. §33-56-30 (2018); TENN. CODE ANN. §48-101-504 (2018); UTAH CODE ANN. §1322-5 (2018); VT. STAT. ANN. TIT. 9, §2473 (2018); VA. CODE ANN. §57-49 (2018); WASH. REV. CODE
§19.09.065 (2018); W. VA. CODE §29-19-5 (2018); WIS. STAT. §202.12 (2019).
69. See, e.g. ALASKA STAT. §10.20.325 (2018); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§10-11420-11422;
CONN. GEN. STAT. §33-1181 (2018); GA. CODE ANN. §14-3-1420 (2018); HAW. REV. STAT. §414D249 (2018); ILL. COMP. STAT. 805 ILCS 105/ §112.35 (2018); IOWA CODE §504.1421 (2019); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. TIT. 13-B, §1112 (2018); MISS. CODE ANN. §79-11-347 (2018); MO. REV. STAT. §
355.706 (2018); NEB. REV. STAT. §21-19,137 (2018); N.M. STAT. ANN. §53-8-53 (2018); N.C. GEN.
STAT. §55A-14-20 (2018); OR. REV. STAT. §65.647 (2017); S.C. CODE ANN. §33-31-1420 (2018);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §47-24-13.1 (2018); TENN. CODE ANN. §48-64-201 (2018); TEX. BUS. ORG.
CODE ANN. §22.360 (2017); UTAH CODE ANN. §16-6A-1410 (2018); VT. STAT. ANN. TIT. 11B, §14.20
(2018); VA. CODE ANN. §13.1-915 (2018); WASH. REV. CODE §23.95.605 (2018); W. VA. CODE
§31E-13-1320 (2018); WIS. STAT. §181.1420 (2019); WYO. STAT. ANN. §17-19-1420 (2018).
70. See, e.g. ALASKA STAT. §10.20.325 (2018); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§10-11420-11422;
CONN. GEN. STAT. §33-1181 (2018); GA. CODE ANN. §14-3-1420 (2018); HAW. REV. STAT. §414D249 (2018); ILL. COMP. STAT. 805 ILCS 105/ §112.35 (2018); IOWA CODE §504.1421 (2019); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. TIT. 13-B, §1112 (2018); MISS. CODE ANN. §79-11-347 (2018); MO. REV. STAT. §
355.706 (2018); NEB. REV. STAT. §21-19,137 (2018); N.M. STAT. ANN. §53-8-53 (2018); N.C. GEN.
STAT. §55A-14-20 (2018); OR. REV. STAT. §65.647 (2017); S.C. CODE ANN. §33-31-1420 (2018);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §47-24-13.1 (2018); TENN. CODE ANN. §48-64-201 (2018); TEX. BUS. ORG.
CODE ANN. §22.360 (2017); UTAH CODE ANN. §16-6A-1410 (2018); VT. STAT. ANN. TIT. 11B, §14.20
(2018); VA. CODE ANN. §13.1-915 (2018); WASH. REV. CODE §23.95.605 (2018); W. VA. CODE
§31E-13-1320 (2018); WIS. STAT. §181.1420 (2019); WYO. STAT. ANN. §17-19-1420 (2018).
71. I.R.C. §501 (West 2017).
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thread that runs through the many categories of potentially tax-exempt
organizations is that they must not serve as investment vehicles whose
profits “inure[] to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual.” 72
Additionally, a substantial portion of a tax-exempt organization’s
activities and expenditures must be addressed to objectives other than
influencing legislation. 73 The law allows for limited lobbying efforts but
sets out a maximum amount, based on exempt purpose expenditures, that
a section 501 entity may expend for such purposes. 74 Section 501(c)(3),
under which many nonprofit organizations obtain tax exemption, includes
a flat prohibition of political activity that supports or opposes a candidate
for public office. 75 Nonprofit governance must ensure that the private
benefit and political restrictions are carefully observed.
V. 2017 TAX CUTS: CRISIS FOR NONPROFITS?
Changes in the tax code during late 2017 have resulted in concern
among some nonprofit executives as to whether donations may decline as
a result. The Wall Street Journal reports that toward the end of 2017,
“Americans . . . poured money into charitable-giving vehicles known as
donor-advised funds, which allow immediate tax deductions but gradual
distributions to nonprofits ̶ a sign of ways the new tax law could reshape
how Americans donate money for years to come.” 76
Not-for-profit colleges and hospitals, according to National Council
of Nonprofit vice president David Thompson, “are probably going to be
fine because they tend to have development offices and tend to have big
donors. . . . It’s the front-line human services groups. They rely on
donations in the community and those are the ones that are probably going
to dry up.” 77 The Council on Foundations estimates that the Tax Cuts and
Jobs Act “will drain $16 billion to $24 billion a year from the nonprofit

72. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (West 2017).
73. Id.
74. I.R.C. §501(h); 26 U.S.C. §4911 (West 2017).
75. I.R.C. §501(c)(3) (West 2017).
76. See Richard Rubin, Charity Funds Take Off as Tax Law Reshapes Giving, WALL ST. J.
(Feb. 1, 2018) at A1, https://www.wsj.com/articles/charity-funds-take-off-as-tax-law-reshapesgiving-1517502089 [https://perma.cc/3544-352N].
77. See J.B. Wogan, Tax Law Could Deliver Billion-Dollar Blow to Social Services,
GOVERNING (Jan. 17, 2018), http://www.governing.com/topics/health-human-services/govnonprofits-tax-law-charitable-giving-human-services.html [https://perma.cc/8JP7-4FR6].
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sector going forward.” 78 In a Los Angeles Times Op-Ed, Bryan
McQueeney writes:
The problem is that while the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act preserves the
deductibility of charitable contributions, it restructures the system so
that millions will lose incentives to give. Most people donate from their
hearts to causes they care about, regardless of taxes. It is undeniable,
however, that the reward for giving will go down and the cost of giving
will go up. . . . The Tax Cuts Act simultaneously raises the standard
deduction to $24,000 for a married couple. For millions it will no longer
make sense to itemize, and that too means fewer charitable gifts: You
can only deduct donations if you itemize. 79

Regarding the likely impact of recent tax code changes resulting in
lower rates and therefore less value to the taxpayer for charitable
donations, director Deborah Cannon states, “While the tax changes may
create less benefit from a donation, those individuals who believe strongly
in a nonprofit’s mission may have more disposable income to contribute
and donors who gave only because of a tax benefit aren’t ones who are
going to advance the mission of the organization.” 80 Director Jack Lowe
states, “The changes in the tax code will require non-profit boards even
more clearly demonstrate and communicate their organization’s value
proposition.” 81 University of Texas at Dallas professor Dennis
McCuistion says:
While there is always angst among the nonprofit community when tax
rates are lowered, I think that less taxes means more giving not less
because there is more to give. Also, while taxes are A factor, they are
seldom THE factor and small gifts that are so important are seldom even
deductible anyway, so why worry? 82

78. See Bryan McQueeney, Op-Ed: The GOP tax reform will devastate charitable giving, L.A.
TIMES (Dec. 27, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-mcqueeney-charitable-givingunder-new-tax-law-20171227-story.html [https://perma.cc/4FMM-T6V9].
79. Id.
80. See e-mail from Deborah Cannon, Corporate and nonprofit director, to Lawrence J.
Trautman (Jan. 26, 2018) (on file with authors).
81. See e-mail from Jack Lowe, Corporate Director, to Lawrence J. Trautman (Feb. 21, 2018,
13:59 EST)(on file with authors).
82. See e-mail from Dennis McCuistion, Clinical Professor of Corporate Governance,
University of Texas at Dallas; Executive Dir., Institute for Excellence in Corporate Governance, to
Lawrence J. Trautman (Jan. 21, 2018, 11:24 EST) (on file with authors).
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VI. GOVERNANCE: THE BASICS
A considerable amount of scholarship has been written about
corporate governance and the duties owed by directors to shareholders in
a for-profit, particularly publicly-traded situation. 83 While less has been
written about governance in a nonprofit enterprise, many of the same
fiduciary duties apply. 84
83. See John Armour, Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Elements of
Corporate Law. Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper No. 20/2009; Yale Law, Economics & Public
Policy Research Paper No. 387; Harvard Law and Economics Research Paper No. 643; Harvard
Public Law Working Paper No. 09-39; ECGI - Law Working Paper No. 134/2009,
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1436551
[https://perma.cc/PLX9-UC8B];
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment, 119 HARV. L. REV.
1735 (2006); William W. Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value. 76 TUL. L. REV.
1275 (2002); John Coffee, The Future as History: The Prospects for Global Convergence in
Corporate Governance and its Implications (Columbia Law School Center for Law and Economic
Studies, Working Paper No. 144, 1999), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=142833
[https://perma.cc/EBX8-ZWSY]; David F. Larcker & Brian Tayan, Seven Myths of Boards of
Directors, INSIGHTS BY STAN. BUS. (Oct. 12, 2015), https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/insights/sevenmyths-boards-directors [https://perma.cc/N7PA-YVXC]; Robert A. Prentice & David B. Spence,
Sarbanes-Oxley as Quack Corporate Governance: How Wise is the Received Wisdom?, 95 GEO. L.J.
1843 (2007); Brian Tayan, The Wells Fargo Cross-Selling Scandal, Rock Center for Corporate
Governance at Stanford University Closer Look Series: Topics, Issues and Controversies in Corporate
Governance No. CGRP-62; Stanford University Graduate School of Business Research Paper No. 171 (Dec. 2, 2016); Chris W. Waddell, Waddell, Kendrick Nguyen, Evan Epstein, Francis Daniel
Siciliano & Joseph Grundfest, Identifying the Legal Contours of the Separation of Economic Rights
and Voting Rights in Publicly Held Corporations (Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford
University Working Paper No. 90, 2010).
84. See Byron F. Egan, How Recent Fiduciary Duty Cases Affect Advice to Directors and
Officers of Delaware and Texas Corporations, 37th Ann. Conf. on Sec. Reg. & Bus. L. 7, 178 (Feb.
13, 2015). See also Ellen P. Aprill, What Critiques of Sarbanes-Oxley Can Teach About Regulation
of Nonprofit Governance, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 765 (2007); Carter G. Bishop, The Deontological
Significance of Nonprofit Corporate Governance Standards: A Fiduciary Duty of Care Without a
Remedy, 57 CATH. U. L. REV. 701 (2008); Evelyn Brody, Charity Governance: What’s Trust Law
Got to Do with it?, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 641 (2005); Sue Chen, Art Deaccessions and the Limits of
Fiduciary Duty, 14 ART ANTIQUITY & L. 103 (2009); Brian D. Galle, Why Do Foundations Follow
the Law?: Evidence from Adoption of the Uniform Prudent Management of Institutional Funds Act,
36 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 532 (2017); Urs Gasser, Herbert Burkert, John G. Palfrey & Jonathan
L. Zittrain, Accountability and Transparency at ICANN, Berkman Center Research Pub. No. 2010-13
(2010); Thomas Lee Hazen & Lisa Love Hazen, Punctilios and Nonprofit Corporate Governance - A
Comprehensive Look at Nonprofit Directors’ Fiduciary Duties, 14 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 347 (2012); Klaus
J. Hopt, The Board of Nonprofit Organizations: Some Corporate Governance Thoughts from Europe
(European Corp. Govn. Institute - Law Working Paper No. 125 2009); Robert A. Katz, Let Charitable
Directors Direct: Why Trust Law Should Not Curb Board Discretion Over a Charitable
Corporation’s Mission and Unrestricted Assets, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 689 (2005); Elizabeth K.
Keating, Mary Fischer, Teresa P. Gordon & Janet S. Greenlee, Assessing Financial Vulnerability in
the Nonprofit Sector (KSG Working Paper No. RWP05-002; Hauser Center for Nonprofit
Organizations Paper No. 27 2005); Benjamin M. Leff, Federal Regulation of Nonprofit Board
Independence: Focus on Independent Stakeholders as a ‘Middle Way’, 99 KY. L.J. 731 (2011); Roy
Mersland & R. Øystein Strøm, Performance and Corporate Governance in Microfinance Institutions,
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Governance law fundamentals for nonprofit organizations largely
mirror those of for-profit organizations and are driven primarily by state
laws. The IRS does not mandate any particular governance structure as a
condition of tax-exempt status. However, the IRS strongly encourages
nonprofit entities to adopt and maintain sound management practices. 85
Additionally, failure to remain in good standing under state law threatens
the very existence of a nonprofit organization and will necessarily threaten
its tax-exempt status. Accordingly, every member of an organization’s
governing body must have a basic understanding of that body’s legal
obligations and his or her role in meeting those obligations. The
discussion below highlights some of the major state law requirements that
must be satisfied in order for nonprofit organizations to remain in good
standing with their state of incorporation. A number of states have
adopted, with or without modifications, some version of either the Model
Nonprofit Corporation Act 86 (MNCA) drafted by the American Bar
Association or the Uniform Unincorporated Nonprofit Association Act 87
(UUNAA) drafted by the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws, or a combination of both. Both acts, and those of
most states, are organized roughly by the life cycle of a nonprofit
organization. For illustration purposes, we will refer to the laws of the
MNCA and UUNAA. However, every state is different, and the laws of
the relevant state must be applied.
Once a nonprofit entity is formed, the MNCA requires that a board
of directors, if not named in the articles of incorporation, be elected.88 The

33 J. BANKING & FIN. 662 (2007); Curtis J. Milhaupt, Nonprofit Organizations as Investor
Protection: Economic Theory, and Evidence from East Asia, 29 YALE J. INT’L L. 169 (2004); Alicia
Plerhoples, Representing Social Enterprise, 20 CLINICAL L. REV. 215 (2013); Dana Brakman Reiser,
Charity Law’s Essentials, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1 (2011); Mark Sidel, The Promise and Limits of
Collective Action for Nonprofit Self-Regulation: Evidence from Asia, 39 NONPROFIT & VOLUNTARY
SECTOR Q. 1039 (2010); Robert J. Yetman & Michelle Yetman, The Effects of Governance on the
Accuracy of Charitable Expenses Reported by Nonprofit Organizations (2011).
85. U.S. Department of The Treasury Internal Revenue Service, Governance and Related
Topics – 501(c)(3) Organizations, IRS (2008), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/governance_
practices.pdf [https://perma.cc/HBD7-QPW2].
86. American Bar Association, Model Nonprofit Corporation Act, (Draft Revision),
AMERICANBAR (2017), apps.americanbar.org/dch/thedl.cfm?filename=/CL580012/newsletterpubs/
mnca.pdf [https://perma.cc/C3RS-8H6M]. The ABA subcommittee responsible for this model act is
currently in the process of reviewing and revising it so that it will conform to the Model Business
Corporations Act, last revised in 2016.
87. National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Uniform Unincorporated
Nonprofit Association Act, UNIFORMLAWS (2015), http://www.uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=
Unincorporated%20Nonprofit%20Association%20Act%20(2008)%20(Last%20Amended%202011
[https://perma.cc/K8AJ-GGZ9].
88. MNCA § 2.05 (2017).
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UUNAA provides for governance of the organization through one or more
managers, which may but need not be labeled as a board of directors. 89
The broad scope of the term manager under the UUNAA easily
encompasses what are traditionally thought of as officers of an
organization, such as president, secretary, or treasurer. The MNCA and
UUNAA both provide that nonprofit organization may have members,
and contain provisions outlining the rights and responsibilities of those
members. 90 But whether there are members or not, both acts contemplate
that there will be some kind of governing body.
The governing body of a nonprofit organization may, but under the
MNCA is not required to, adopt bylaws. 91 The UUNAA likewise does not
require formal bylaws, but speaks in terms of governing principles. This
term encompasses not only bylaws, to the extent they exist for a particular
organization, but also “agreements, whether oral, in a record, or implied
from its established practices, or in any combination thereof, which
govern the purpose or operation of an unincorporated nonprofit
association . . . .” 92
Both acts contain provisions that specifically outline the rights and
responsibilities of directors. As noted above, the MNCA requires that a
nonprofit organizations have a board of directors with fixed terms, with
some exceptions. Under the MNCA, a nonprofit organization may
establish a “designated body” to exercise the powers that would ordinarily
be exercised by a board.93 The UUNAA is somewhat more flexible in how
a nonprofit organization’s governing body is denominated and structured,
but it achieves essentially the same result. Both acts place responsibility
for oversight of the organization’s activities upon its governing body. 94
Neither act specifies any particular qualifications that a director or
manager must possess. Under both the MNCA and UUNAA, members of
a nonprofit organization’s governing body owe a fiduciary duty to the
organization, requiring them to act in good faith, with due care, and in
what they “reasonably believe[]” to be in the best interest of their
organization. 95
In discharging their duties to a nonprofit organization, members of
its governing body may participate in regular or specially called

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

UUNAA § 2(3) (2015).
MNCA § 6.01 (2017) and UUNAA §2(4) (2015).
MNCA § 2.06 (2017).
UUNAA § 2(2) (2015).
MNCA § 8.12 (2017).
MNCA § 8.01 (2017) and UUNAA § 21 (2015).
MNCA § 8.30 (2017) and UUNAA § 22 (2015).
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meetings. 96 To inform their decision making when acting in their
governance role, directors or managers have a right to relevant
information, 97 and are generally shielded from liability for their decisions
and actions, provided they have been made in good faith and upon due
diligence. 98 Both acts also provide for indemnification to directors or
managers who incur expenses or are made a party to a proceeding as a
result of their actions, provided that they have met their fiduciary
obligations. 99
Because it places governance under the broad umbrella term of
“manager(s),” the UUNAA does not have provisions addressed
specifically to “officers” in the traditional sense of corporate governance.
The MNCA, however, contains a separate subchapter addressed to
officers. Under the MNCA, a nonprofit organization “has the officers
described in its articles of incorporation or bylaws, or appointed or elected
by the board of directors in accordance with the articles or bylaws.” 100
VII. FIDUCIARY DUTIES
Like directors, officers owe a fiduciary duty to the organization and
must act in good faith, with due care, and in a manner they reasonably
believe to be in the best interest of the organization. 101 Like directors,
officers who have complied with their fiduciary obligations are shielded
from liability 102 and may be entitled to indemnification for expenses or
costs associated with their actions as officers. 103
The UUNAA does not contain a provision that specifically mandates
records to be kept by the organization, 104 but the MNCA requires that
certain records be generated and maintained by the organization for a
specified period of time. 105 The MNCA grants members of the
organization the right to inspect the records that must be maintained, 106
and, to the extent that an organization subject to the UUNAA generates

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
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MNCA § 8.31 (2017) and UUNAA § 8 (2015).
MNCA § 8.51 et seq. (2017) and UUNAA § 26 (2015).
MNCA § 8.40 (2017).
MNCA § 8.42 (2017).
MNCA § 8.42(d) (2017).
MNCA § 8.50 et seq. (2017).
UUNAA § 24, comment (2015).
MNCA § 16.01 (2017).
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records, that act also grants a right of inspection to members and
managers. 107
VIII. IMPORTANCE OF STATE LAW
Application of state law regarding fiduciary duties of directors may
be observed in the fifth circuit’s sharp criticism in Gearhart Industries,
Inc. v. Smith International of the parties’ failure to cite Texas cases in
their briefs and reliance on Delaware case law:
We are both surprised and inconvenienced by the circumstances that,
despite their multitudinous and voluminous briefs and exhibits, neither
plaintiffs nor defendants seriously attempted to analyze officers’ and
directors’ fiduciary duties or the business judgment rule under Texas
law. This is particularly so in view of the authorities cited in their
discussions of the business judgment rule: Smith and Gearhart argue
back and forth over the applicability of the plethora of out-of-state cases
they cite, yet they ignore the fact that we are obligated to decide these
aspects of this case under Texas law. . . . 108

Byron Egan observes that:
The Fifth Circuit stated in Gearhart that under Texas law “[t]hree broad
duties stem from the fiduciary status of corporate directors; namely the
duties of obedience, loyalty, and due care,” and commented that (i) the
duty of obedience requires a director to avoid committing ultra vires
acts, i.e., acts beyond the scope of the authority of the corporation as
defined by its articles of incorporation or the laws of the state of
incorporation, (ii) the duty of loyalty dictates that a director must act in
good faith and must not allow his personal interests to prevail over the
interests of the corporation, and (iii) the duty of due care requires that a
director must handle his corporate duties with such care as an ordinarily
prudent man would use under similar circumstances. Good faith under
Gearhart is an element of the duty of loyalty. Gearhart remains the
seminal case for defining the fiduciary duties of directors in
Texas . . . . 109

107. UUNAA § 24 (2015).
108. See Byron F. Egan, How Recent Fiduciary Duty Cases Affect Advice to Directors and
Officers of Delaware and Texas Corporations, 37th Ann. Conf. on Sec. Reg. & Bus. L. 7 (Feb. 13,
2015) (citing Gearhart Indus., Inc. v. Smith Int’l, Inc., 741 F.2d 707, 719 n.4 (5th Cir. 1984) (emphasis
in original, internal citations omitted)).
109. Id. at 7.
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IX. CORE PERSON ATTRIBUTES, QUALITIES, AND SKILLS REQUIRED OF
EVERY DIRECTOR
A.

Every Nonprofit Board Has an Insatiable Need for Director Talent

Every board is responsible for approving nominees for election as
directors. To assist in this task, most boards will designate a standing
committee, usually called the “nominating and governance committee,”
which is responsible for reviewing and recommending nominees to the
board. In a for-profit environment, the nominating and governance
committee should be comprised solely of independent directors as defined
by the rules of the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) 110 and the board’s
corporate governance guidelines. A written charter for every standing
committee should be adopted by the full board. 111 Although nonprofit
organizations are not subject to the same requirements as publicly-traded
enterprises, use of SEC-mandated reporting requirements, practices and
standards may help ensure better nonprofit governance. Therefore, in
evaluating the qualifications of candidates, the nominating and
governance committee will be well advised to look for the following
minimum desired personal attributes, qualifications, qualities,
professional skills, and experience in all director candidates.
B.

Desired Personal Attributes

What human qualities are desired for every board member? This
seems an appropriate starting point for director recruitment and selection.
Every nonprofit board should agree on a clear statement of desired
personal attributes of all board members to provide guidance to the
nominating and governance committee as they search for director
candidates. As is the case in for-profit enterprises, each director candidate
should possess the following necessary core personal attributes: high
standards of ethical behavior; availability; outstanding achievement in the
individual’s personal and professional life; possession of strong

110. See SEC, NASD & NYSE Rulemaking Rel. No. 34-48745, NASD and NYSE Rulemaking:
Relating to Corporate Governance (2003).
111. See
NYSE
Euronext
Corporate
Governance
Guide,
NYSE
(2014),
https://www.nyse.com/publicdocs/nyse/listing/NYSE_Corporate_Governance_Guide.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Y92L-VAPA]. See also Katherine M. O’Regan & Sharon M. Oster, Does the
Structure and Composition of the Board Matter? The Case of Nonprofit Organizations, 21(1) J. L.,
ECON. & ORGAN. 205 (2005).
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interpersonal and communication skills; independence; and soundness of
judgment. 112
C.

Personal Integrity

Every board nominating committee should have a focus on personal
integrity as a sought-after candidate characteristic. High standards of
ethical behavior are an absolute must. The potential costs to the enterprise
and other directors are just too high to assume likely risks. The risk of
litigation for lapses of personal integrity is a major reason why for-profit
boards tend to find directors who are already well-known to at least one
sitting director when looking for replacements. This propensity appears
motivated by the desire of sitting directors to mitigate perceived risks to
themselves and the organization. The risk, to both reputation and personal
net worth, is likely reduced by recruitment of a new already-known
director. Far too many instances of fraud or substantial injury brought
upon a nonprofit raise the question, “where were the directors?” 113
D.

Adequate Time Availability and Schedule Flexibility

As we ponder the impact of fraud on many of our most important
nonprofit institutions, consider how much time a directorship should
require. Certainly, serving on a for-profit board these days requires a
significant time commitment, even under normal circumstances. The last
two decades has brought significant increases to the time demands placed
on directors. Sarbanes-Oxley legislation 114 during 2002 and Dodd-Frank
reforms 115 have each added many hours to the amount of time directors
must devote to board responsibilities. As a result, while each board is
different, Kenneth P. Kopelman observes:
Trying to overlay upwards of 175 hours of annual board service—
including review and preparation, travel, board and committee meetings,
plus informal calls and emails on top of a full time staff or line job is
surely a challenge both for the executive and his or her employer.
112. Lawrence J. Trautman, The Matrix: The Board’s Responsibility for Director Selection and
Recruitment, 11 FLA. ST. U. BUS. REV. 75, 82 (2012) [hereinafter “The Matrix”].
113. See discussion of United Way of New York, supra note 39; Penn State University and Jerry
Sandusky, supra note 29; Michigan State University and Dr. Larry Nassar, supra note 35.
114. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, See also Lisa M.
Fairfax, Form Over Substance?: Officer Certification and the Promise of Enhanced Personal
Accountability Under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 55 RUTGERS L. REV. 1 (2002).
115. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, H.R. 4173, 111th Cong.
(2010); see also Andrew Verstein & Roberta Romano, Assessing Dodd-Frank, YALE LAW & ECON.
RESEARCH PAPER NO. 434 (2011).
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Recently retired, seasoned executives seem to be able to get up to speed
quickly and devote the ongoing time. 116

In the for-profit environment, because of increased time demands
resulting from greater requirements falling on members of audit and
compensation committees, every director will find it difficult, if not
impossible, to have the schedule flexibility allowing for concurrent
service on more than just a few boards. While nonprofit directors should
not expect to deal with a crisis situation such as a hostile battle for
corporate control or corporate disasters such as the BP Gulf oil spill, 117
other crisis situations may arise from natural disasters such as hurricanes
or tornadoes, pandemics, and fires, thus providing the unexpected crisis
backdrop for a nonprofit board. 118
E.

A Passion for the Mission

In the for-profit world, broad business experience, including
considerable prior high-level decision making and a demonstrated track
record of problem solving is an obvious set of primary skills desired for
every director. However, among nonprofit boards, often the most valuable
assets are those individuals who have the passion and desire to devote
their talents and substantial amounts of their time toward achieving the
organization’s mission.
F.

Strong Interpersonal and Communication Skills

A major requirement of productive directors is the ability to work
well with others; and the ability to ask the right penetrating questions at
the right time, without being disagreeable. These skills can be developed,
but are not amply present in all.
G.

Importance of Independence

Actual independence is evidenced by an ability to represent the total
enterprise interests of the company (as opposed to representing the
interests of any particular group—for non-management directors, they
must be independent in fact of management and the organization). In the
116. See Kramer Levin, Kopelman Participates in NACD Directorship Roundtable,
(2010),
http://www.kramerlevin.com/Kopelman-Participates-in-NACDKRAMERLEVIN
Directorship-Roundtable-04-14-2010/ [https://perma.cc/R5DZ-L9GL].
117. Lawrence J. Trautman, The Board’s Responsibility for Crisis Governance, 13 HASTINGS
BUS. L.J. 275 (2017).
118. Id.
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for-profit environment, corporate governance has progressively become
federalized during the not too distant past as a result of requirements
imposed by the Sarbanes-Oxley 119 legislation (in response to fraud at
Adelphia Communications, Enron, Worldcom, and others) and DoddFrank 120 (in response to the 2008–09 financial crisis). Independence is
now required for members of for-profit audit, compensation, and
nominating and governance committees. 121
Each nonprofit board should adopt a clearly-written statement
specifying what constitutes director independence. As an example, here is
the statement adopted by profit-oriented Texas Instruments:
The board has adopted the following standards for determining
independence.
A. In no event will a director be considered independent if:
1. He or she is a current partner of or is employed by the company’s
independent auditors; or
2. An immediate family member of the director is (a) a current partner
of the company’s independent auditors or (b) currently employed by
the company’s independent auditors and personally works on the
company’s audit.
B. In no event will a director be considered independent if, within the
preceding three years:
1. He or she was employed by the company (except in the capacity of
interim chairman of the board, chief executive officer or other
executive officer) or any of its subsidiaries;
2. He or she received more than $120,000 during any twelve-month
period in direct compensation from TI (other than (a) director and
committee fees and pension or other forms of deferred compensation
and (b) compensation received for former service as an interim
chairman of the board, chief executive officer or other executive
officer);
3. An immediate family member of the director was employed as an
executive officer by the company or any of its subsidiaries;
4. An immediate family member of the director received more than
$120,000 during any twelve-month period in direct compensation from
119.
120.
(2010).
121.

See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745.
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, H.R. 4173, 111th Cong.
See NYSE Euronext Corporate Governance Guidelines (2011).
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TI (excluding compensation as a non-executive officer employee of the
company);
5. He or she was (but is no longer) a partner or employee of the
company’s independent auditors and personally worked on the
company’s audit within that time;
6. An immediate family member of the director was (but is no longer)
a partner or employee of the company’s independent auditors and
personally worked on the company’s audit within that time;
7. He or she was an executive officer of another company, at which
any of TI’s current executive officers at the same time served on that
company’s compensation committee;
8. An immediate family member of the director was an executive
officer of another company at which any of TI’s current executive
officers at the same time served on that company’s compensation
committee;
9. He or she was, and remains at the time of the determination, an
executive officer or employee of a company that made payments to, or
received payments from, TI for property or services in an amount
which, in any single fiscal year, exceeded the greater of $1 million or 2
percent of the other company’s consolidated gross revenues for its last
completed fiscal year (for purposes of this standard, charitable
contributions are not considered “payments”); or
10. An immediate family member of the director was, and remains at
the time of the determination, an executive officer of a company that
made payments to, or received payments from, TI for property or
services in an amount which, in any single fiscal year, exceeded the
greater of $1 million or 2 percent of the other company’s consolidated
gross revenues for its last completed fiscal year (for purposes of this
standard, charitable contributions are not considered “payments”).
C. Audit Committee members may not accept any consulting,
advisory or other compensatory fee from TI, other than in their
capacity as members of the board or any board committee.
Compensatory fees do not include the receipt of fixed amounts of
compensation under a retirement plan (including deferred
compensation) for prior service with TI (provided that such
compensation is not contingent in any way on continued service).
D. The following relationships will not be considered material
relationships with the company for the purpose of determining director
independence:
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1. A director is an employee, director or trustee of a charitable
organization and TI or the TI Foundation makes discretionary
contributions to that organization that are less than the greater of
$50,000 or 2 percent of the organization’s latest publicly available
consolidated gross revenue.
2. A director is an employee, director or trustee of another entity that is
indebted to TI or to which TI is indebted, and the total amount of either
company’s indebtedness to the other is less than 2 percent of the total
consolidated assets of the entity he or she serves as an executive officer,
director or trustee.

For any other relationship, the determination of whether it is
material, and consequently whether the director involved is independent,
will be made by directors who satisfy the independence criteria set forth
in this section. For purposes of these independence determinations,
“immediate family member” will have the same meaning as under the
NYSE rules. 122
H.

Soundness of Judgment

A demonstrated soundness of judgment and effectiveness, as
evidenced by a pro-active and results oriented approach to problem
solving, and the ability to make independent, analytical inquiries of
factual patterns is desired. Also helpful is an interest in and familiarity
with management theory and best business practices.
I.

Experience Attributes

Every board should also set forth a statement of desired experience
attributes for each director candidate. In a typical for-profit setting, these
might include such characteristics as:
•

General business experience – Possess a general understanding
of elements related to the success of a company like ours in the
current business environment;

•

Specific industry knowledge – Possess a reasonable knowledge
about our businesses;

122. See Texas Instruments, Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) at 55 (Mar. 7, 2011),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/97476/000120677411000437/texasins_def14a.htm
[http://perma.cc/8CMK-WKPA].
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Financial acumen – Should have a good understanding of
business finance and financial statements;

•

Educational and professional background – Should possess a
complementary set of skills within a framework of total board
knowledge base;

•

Diversity of background and viewpoint – Bring to the board an
appropriate level of diversity; and

•

Other attributes – Provide those special attributes identified as
needed. 123

1011

X. BOARD COMPOSITION AND COMMITTEE STRUCTURE
The business of any corporation is conducted and overseen by its
board of directors. 124
A.

Each Board is Different

Board composition for nonprofit entities is vastly different from that
of profit seeking organizations in some respects, and similar in others. The
needs of a local or national U.S. nonprofit board will differ from
multinational governance involving global production, marketing, or
international financing relationships necessary in organizations such as
Coca-Cola, General Electric, Microsoft, or Pfizer. However, the
governance skills and lessons learned by corporate directors in such
organizations may prove to be valuable assets in a nonprofit setting. The
concerns and issues faced by an entity having international operations,
such as Doctors Without Borders, are profoundly different from the
mission of a local Humane Society dealing with the needs of abandoned
animals. To a considerable extent, a board standing committee structure
tailored to the specific needs of a nonprofit organization should result in
best practice. In smaller nonprofits, business may be conducted as a
committee of the whole, with efficiency increased by providing for
particularly necessary committees such as audit and nominating and
governance. Houston director Deborah Cannon advises, “Nonprofits need
123. See Trautman, The Matrix, supra note 113 at 87.
124. See Byron F. Egan, How Recent Fiduciary Duty Cases Affect Advice to Directors and
Officers of Delaware and Texas Corporations, 37th Ann. Conf. on Sec. Reg. & Bus. L. 3 (Feb. 13,
2015), (citing TBOC § 21.401); TBCA art. 2.31; and DEL. CODE ANN. Tit. 8 § 141(a) (title 8 of the
Delaware Code Annotated to be hereinafter referred to as the “DGCL”); CA, Inc. v. AFSCME
Employees Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 238 (Del. 2008) (Board authority to manage the corporation
under DGCL § 141(a) may not be infringed by a bylaw adopted by the stockholders under DGCL §
109 in a manner that restricts the power of directors to exercise their fiduciary duties).
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to ensure that they have strong boards with diverse backgrounds who
mirror their organization’s target audience.” 125
B.

Board Committee Structure

In a for-profit setting, many corporations have committees such as
audit and compensation mandated by regulators and securities listing and
trading organizations to be composed of independent directors (nonemployees, employee-related, or otherwise compromised). 126 The
standing committee schematic prevalent in most modern for-profit
organizations consists of the following minimal structure: (1) audit, (2)
compensation, (3) executive, and (4) nominating and governance. 127 This
is not necessarily so for the nonprofit sector. However, a recent look at
the organization structure of The United Way Worldwide Board of
Trustees, having “fiduciary oversight of United Way Worldwide, and . . .
responsib[ility] for overseeing the business affairs of the organization,”
discloses: a Board Chair; Secretary of the Board; Treasurer and Chair,
Finance Committee; Chair, Audit Committee; Chair, Executive
Compensation Committee; Chair, Membership Accountability
Committee; Chair, Governance Committee; Chair, Resource
Development; and Chair, Brand Stewardship. 128
The duties and responsibilities will be specified in charters drafted
and adopted for each core standing committee. Examples of committee
charters and experience from the for-profit world may serve as valuable
templates for nonprofit organizations and are offered in the following
pages for consideration and to provoke critical thinking. A discussion of
the typical responsibilities for each of these core standing committees and
other potentially valuable committees will now be presented along with
thoughts about relevant nominee considerations.

125. See e-mail from Deborah Cannon, Corporate and nonprofit director, to Lawrence J.
Trautman (Jan. 26, 2018) (on file with authors). See also Lawrence J. Trautman, Corporate
Boardroom Diversity: Why Are We Still Talking About This?, 17 SCHOLAR 219 (2015),
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=2047750 [https://perma.cc/KPC3-8HWG].
126. See Trautman, The Matrix, supra note 113.
127. See Trautman, The Matrix, supra note 113.
128. United Way 2016 Annual Report, UNITED WAY, (2018), https://www.unitedway.org/
annual-report/2016 [https://perma.cc/46VD-FNX2].
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Audit (Risk) Committee

Financial, tax, and accounting expertise is critical to the governance
of any nonprofit organization. 129 As discussed above, meticulous
compliance with federal and state laws is critical to maintain a nonprofit
organization’s tax-exempt status, and thus the tax-deductibility of
contributions to that organization. Since nonprofit organizations are not
investment vehicles and thus do not market ownership interests, they fall
outside of the reporting and disclosure requirements imposed upon
publicly-held organizations. However, they are still accountable for their
financial activities, and much of their financial activity is subject to public
disclosure. Moreover, to the extent that they solicit contributions, many
nonprofits are subject to state laws requiring licensure prior to fundraising
solicitations. Therefore, much can be learned about the function of an
audit committee by looking at how they are structured and operate in SECregulated environments.
In a for-profit setting, “a board’s audit committee will be a standing
committee established to comply with the requirements of Section
129. See Christopher P. Agoglia, Timothy Doupnik & George T. Tsakumis, Principles-Based
Versus Rules-Based Accounting Standards: The Influence of Standard Precision and Audit Committee
Strength on Financial Reporting Decisions, 86 ACCT. REV. 747 (2011); Robert M. Bushman & Abbie
J. Smith, Financial Accounting Information and Corporate Governance, JAE ROCHESTER
CONFERENCE (2000), https://ssrn.com/abstract=253302 [https://perma.cc/R93T-FY79]; Robert M.
Bushman & Abbie J. Smith, Transparency, Financial Accounting Information, and Corporate
Governance, 9 ECON. POL’Y REV. (2003); Joseph V. Carcello, Carl W. Hollingsworth, April Klein &
Terry L. Neal, Audit Committee Financial Expertise, Competing Corporate Governance Mechanisms,
and Earnings Management (2006), https://ssrn.com/abstract=887512 [https://perma.cc/W7GP76FE]; Gin Chong, Detecting Fraud: What Are Auditor’s Responsibilities?, 24(2) J. CORP. ACCT. &
FIN. 47 (2013); Jeffrey Cohen, Ganesh Krishnamoorthy & Arnold Wright, The Corporate
Governance Mosaic and Financial Reporting Quality, J. ACCT. LIT. 87 (2004); Aswath Damodaran,
Risk Management: A Corporate Governance Manual (2010), https://ssrn.com/abstract=1681017
[https://perma.cc/U3AN-RWU7]; Gene Imhoff, Accounting Quality, Auditing and Corporate
Governance,
ACCT.
HORIZONS
SUPP.
117
(2003), https://ssrn.com/abstract=374380
[https://perma.cc/J27Y-65AM]; April Klein, Audit Committee, Board of Director Characteristics,
and Earnings Management, NYU, Law and Economics Research Paper No. 06-42
(2000), https://ssrn.com/abstract=246674 [https://perma.cc/T4SB-DWFS]; Ranjani Krishnan,
Michelle Yetman, Robert Yetman, Financial Disclosure Management by Nonprofit Organizations
(2002), https://ssrn.com/abstract=319581 [https://perma.cc/G97T-8QDA]; Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, The
Promises and Perils of Using Big Data to Regulate Nonprofits, 94 WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3350677 [https://perma.cc/T46G-R663]; Christine Petrovits, Catherine
Shakespeare & Aimee Shih, The Causes and Consequences of Internal Control Problems in Nonprofit
Organizations (2010), https://ssrn.com/abstract=1582765 [https://perma.cc/MQ6Y-MGLN];
Douglas F. Prawitt, Jason L Smith & David A. Wood, Internal Audit Quality and Earnings
Management, 84 ACCT. REV. 1255 (2009); Robert Rosen, Risk Management and Corporate
Governance: The Case of Enron, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1157 (2003) Robert Yetman & Michelle Yetman,
The Effects of Governance on the Accuracy of Charitable Expenses Reported by Nonprofit
Organizations (2011), https://ssrn.com/abstract=590961 [https://perma.cc/5Q7S-QKG4].
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3(a)(58)(A) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 130 as amended. All
members of the audit committee must be independent under the rules of
the NYSE and the board’s corporate governance guidelines.” 131 As
demonstrated by the Audit Committee Charter for AT&T, the audit
committee of any public corporation will generally be responsible to:
“assist the Board in its oversight of: (1) the integrity of the financial
statements of the Company, (2) the independent auditor’s qualifications
and independence, (3) the performance of the Company’s internal audit
function and independent auditors, and (4) the compliance by the
Company with legal and regulatory requirements.” 132 In addition,
Committee Membership
At the first meeting of the Board of Directors following each Annual
Meeting of Stockholders, the Board, after receiving the
recommendations of the Corporate Governance and Nominating
Committee, shall appoint the members of the Committee and shall
determine the Chairperson of the Committee, each to serve at the
pleasure of the Board. Committee members shall not have a fixed term.
The Committee shall consist of no fewer than three members, including
the Chairperson. Each member of the Committee shall meet the
independence and experience requirements of the listing standards of the
New York Stock Exchange and the independence requirements of
Section 10A(m)(3) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the
“Exchange Act”) and the rules of the Commission thereunder. The
Board shall periodically determine (i) whether each Committee member
meets such independence and experience requirements and (ii) whether
or not any member of the Committee is an ‘audit committee financial
expert’ as that term is defined by the rules and regulations of the
Commission. Committee members may not accept, directly or
indirectly, any consulting, advisory, or other compensatory fee from the
Company other than in their capacity as a Director.
Procedures
The Committee shall meet as often as it determines, but not less than six
times a year. The Committee shall meet periodically with management,
the senior internal auditing executive, and the independent auditor in
separate executive sessions. The Committee may request any officer or
employee of the Company or the Company’s outside counsel or
130.
131.
132.

See The Matrix, supra note 113 at 91 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78a (2008)).
See The Matrix, supra note 113 at 91.
Audit Committee of the Board of Directors of AT&T, Charter (as amended June 26, 2015),
INVESTORS.ATT (2015), https://investors.att.com/~/media/Files/A/ATT-IR/committees-and-charters/
audit-committee-charter.pdf [https://perma.cc/529K-TN2H].
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independent auditor to attend a meeting of the Committee or to meet
with any members of, or consultants to, the Committee. After the
Committee meets or otherwise takes action, it shall, as soon as
practicable, make a report of its activities at a meeting of the Board. The
Committee may form and delegate authority to subcommittees when
determined by the Committee to be necessary or appropriate.
Committee Authority and Responsibilities
The Committee shall have the authority, to the extent it deems necessary
or appropriate, to conduct investigations and to retain independent legal,
accounting or other advisors. The Committee may authorize and direct
the payment of compensation by the Company to the independent
auditor for the purpose of preparing or issuing an audit report or for other
services and to any advisors employed by the Committee as well as the
payment of ordinary administrative expenses of the Committee that are
necessary or appropriate in carrying out its duties. The Committee shall
review and reassess the adequacy of this Charter annually and
recommend any proposed changes to the Corporate Governance and
Nominating Committee. The Committee shall annually evaluate the
Committee’s own performance and share such evaluation with the
Corporate Governance and Nominating Committee.
Oversight of the Company’s Relationship with the Independent
Auditor

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2019

1.

The Committee shall be directly responsible for the
appointment, compensation, retention and oversight of the
work of the independent auditor employed by the Company for
the purpose of preparing or issuing an audit report or
performing other audit, review or attest services (including
resolution of disagreements between management and the
independent auditor regarding financial reporting). The
independent auditor shall report directly to the Committee.

2.

The independent auditor may be engaged by the Company to
perform audit services and, to the extent permitted by
applicable Federal securities laws and rules thereunder, nonaudit services, in each case only where the Committee has preapproved each such service, subject to the de minimus
exception for non-audit services described in Section
10A(i)(1)(B) of the Exchange Act. The Committee may either
approve such audit and non-audit services or adopt preapproval policies and procedures provided that the policies and
procedures are detailed as to the particular service provided and
the Committee is informed of each such service. As a part of
such policies and procedures, the Committee may delegate
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authority to subcommittees consisting of one or more members
to grant pre-approvals of audit and permitted non-audit
services.
3.

The Committee shall establish policies for the Company’s
hiring of employees or former employees of the independent
auditor.

4.

The Committee shall obtain and review a report from the
independent auditor at least annually regarding: (a) the
independent auditor’s internal quality-control procedures, (b)
any material issues raised by the most recent internal qualitycontrol review, or peer review, of the firm, or by any inquiry or
investigation by governmental or professional authorities
within the preceding five years respecting one or more
independent audits carried out by the firm, (c) any steps taken
to deal with any such issues, and (d) all relationships between
the independent auditor and the Company. After reviewing the
foregoing report and the independent auditor’s work during the
year, the Committee shall evaluate the qualifications,
performance and independence of the independent auditor,
taking into account the opinions of management and the senior
internal auditing executive. As a part of this evaluation, the
Committee shall review and evaluate the performance and
qualifications of the lead partner of the independent auditor.

5.

The Committee shall, as appropriate, discuss with management
the timing and process for the rotation of the lead audit partner,
the concurring partner and any other active audit engagement
team partner and consider whether, in order to assure
continuing auditor independence, it is appropriate to rotate the
independent auditing firm.

6.

The Committee shall meet with the independent auditor prior
to the audit to discuss the planning and staffing of the audit.

Financial Statement and Disclosure Matters
7.

The Committee shall review and discuss with management and
the independent auditor . . . the annual audited financial
statements . . . .

8.

The Committee shall review and discuss with management and
the independent auditor . . . the quarterly financial
statements. . . . and the results of the independent auditor’s
review of the quarterly financial statements [not applicable if
quarterly reports are not required].
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The Committee shall periodically review and discuss with
management and the independent auditor: (a) any major issues
regarding accounting principles and financial statement
presentations, including any significant changes in the
Company’s selection or application of accounting principles,
and major issues as to the adequacy of the Company’s internal
controls and any special audit steps adopted in light of material
control deficiencies; (b) analyses prepared by management
and/or the independent auditor setting forth significant
financial reporting issues and judgments made in connection
with the preparation of the financial statements, including
analyses of the effects of alternative GAAP methods on the
financial statements; and (c) the effect of regulatory and
accounting initiatives, as well as off-balance sheet structures,
on the financial statements of the Company.

10. The Committee shall review and discuss with management and
the independent auditor reports from the independent auditor
on:
a. All critical accounting policies and practices to be used;
b. All alternative treatments of financial information within generally
accepted accounting principles that have been discussed with
management, ramifications of the use of such alternative disclosures and
treatments, and the treatment preferred by the independent auditor; and
c. Other material written communications between the independent
auditor and management, such as any management letter or schedule of
unadjusted differences.
11. The Committee shall review and discuss with management the
Company’s earnings press releases as well as financial
information and earnings guidance provided to analysts and
rating agencies. Such discussion may be done generally (i.e.,
discussion of the types of information to be disclosed and the
type of presentation to be made). The Committee need not
discuss in advance each earnings release or each instance in
which the Company may provide earnings guidance.
12. The Committee shall review and discuss with management the
Company’s major financial risk exposures and the steps
management has taken to monitor and control such exposures,
including the Company’s risk assessment and risk management
policies. This would include, among other matters, evaluating
risk in the context of financial policies, counterparty and credit
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risk, and the appropriate mitigation of risk, including through
the use of insurance where appropriate.
13. The Committee shall annually discuss with the independent
auditor the matters required to be discussed by Auditing
Standard No. 16, Communications with Audit Committees,
including any difficulties encountered in the course of the audit
work, any restrictions on the scope of activities or access to
requested information, and any significant disagreements with
management. The discussion shall address, to the extent
applicable, any accounting adjustments that were noted or
proposed by the independent auditor but were “passed” (as
immaterial or otherwise), any communications between the
audit team and the auditor’s national office with respect to
auditing or accounting issues presented by the engagement and
any “management” or “internal control” letter issued, or
proposed to be issued, by the independent auditor.
14. The Committee shall review disclosures made to the
Committee by the Company’s Chief Executive Officer and
Chief Financial Officer . . . about significant deficiencies or
material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal
control over financial reporting and any fraud involving
management or other employees who have a significant role in
the Company’s internal control over financial reporting. The
Committee shall review with management, the senior internal
auditing executive, and the independent auditor, as appropriate,
attestations and reports by the independent auditor on internal
control over financial reporting.
Oversight of the Company’s Internal Audit Function
15. The Committee shall review with management the
appointment and replacement of the senior internal auditing
executive and shall annually evaluate his or her performance.
The Committee shall provide the senior internal auditing
executive with access to communicate personally and directly
with the members of the Audit Committee at any time on any
auditing or internal control matter.
16. The Committee shall review with the senior internal auditing
executive the significant reports to management prepared by
the internal auditing department and management’s responses.
17. The Committee shall review with the senior internal auditing
executive, the independent auditor and management the
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internal audit department responsibilities, budget and staffing
and the internal audit plan for the coming year.
Compliance Oversight Responsibilities
18. The Committee shall obtain from the independent auditor
assurance that Section 10A(b) of the Exchange Act (relating to
reports by the independent auditor made to the Company of
illegal acts discovered by the independent auditor) has not been
implicated.
19. The Committee shall establish procedures for the receipt,
retention and treatment of complaints received by the Company
regarding accounting, internal accounting controls or auditing
matters, and the confidential, anonymous submission by
employees or other interested persons, of concerns regarding
questionable accounting or auditing matters.
20. The Committee shall discuss with management and the
independent auditor any correspondence with regulators or
governmental agencies and any published reports made known
to AT&T’s executive officers that raise material issues
regarding the Company’s financial statements or accounting
policies.
21. The Committee shall discuss with the Company’s General
Counsel any significant legal, compliance or regulatory matters
that may have a material impact on the financial statements or
the Company’s compliance policies.
22. The Committee shall meet periodically, but no less than
annually, with the Company’s Chief Compliance Officer
(“CCO”) regarding the CCO’s assessment of the Company’s
compliance and ethics risks, the effectiveness of the
Company’s Corporate Compliance Program, and any other
compliance related matters that either the Committee or the
CCO deems appropriate. The Committee shall provide the
CCO with access to communicate personally and directly with
the members of the Audit Committee at any time on any matter
of compliance and ethics. The Committee shall oversee the
administration and enforcement of the Company’s Code of
Business Conduct, Code of Ethics and Corporate Compliance
Program.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2019

49

Akron Law Review, Vol. 52 [2019], Iss. 4, Art. 2

1020

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[52:971

Other
23. The Committee shall be responsible for any other matters
expressly delegated to the Committee by the Board from time
to time.
Limitation of Committee’s Role
While the Committee has the responsibilities and powers set forth in this
Charter, it is not the duty of the Committee to plan or conduct audits or
to determine that the Company’s financial statements and disclosures
are complete and accurate and are in accordance with generally accepted
accounting principles and applicable rules and regulations. These are the
responsibilities of management and the independent auditor. 133

D.

The Financial Expert

A nonprofit’s audit committee will likely be best chaired by a
director who brings many years of independent accounting, auditing, and
tax experience. Lessons gained from actual audit experience such as
statistical sampling and other audit methodologies and a familiarity with
and understanding of highly technical emerging accounting issues is
valuable in understanding the audit function. 134
E.

Compensation Committee

Board compensation committees exist to ensure that executive
compensation comports with performance and is aligned with
marketplace requirements without being unduly excessive.135 The
efficient operation of a for-profit board compensation committee will
serve to provide the enterprise with motivated executives whereby
compensation is tied to performance, thus staving off reputation damage
caused by reports in the press alleging excessive and improper levels of
compensation. Examples of such legal actions include allegations of
excessive compensation and perks received previously in the New York
United Way case. 136 Under Texas law, officer and director compensation

133. Id.
134. See The Matrix, supra note 113 at 93.
135. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Executive Compensation: Who Decides?, 83 TEX. L. REV.
1615 (2005); Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Pay Without Performance: Overview of the Issues,
30 J. CORP. L. 647 (2005).
136. See supra note 39.
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in nonprofit corporations may present issues of conflict of interest. 137
Regarding compensation issues, Byron Egan writes:
[S]ince non-profit corporations often seek to qualify for exemption from
federal income taxation under § 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code
of 1986, as amended (the ‘IRC’), as organizations organized and
operated exclusively for charitable, religious, literary or scientific
purposes and whose earnings do not inure to the benefit of any private
shareholders or individuals, the compensation of directors and officers
of non-profit corporations can be subject to scrutiny by the Internal
Revenue Service (‘IRS’). Excessive compensation can be deemed the
sort of private inurement that could cause the organization to lose its

137. See Byron F. Egan, How Recent Fiduciary Duty Cases Affect Advice to Directors and
Officers of Delaware and Texas Corporations, 37th Ann. Conf. on Sec. Reg. & Bus. L. (Feb. 13, 2015)
at 178, citing TBOC § 22.230 of the Texas Non-Profit Corporation Act and provides as follows:
Section 22.230. Contracts or Transactions Involving Interested Directors, Officers, and
Members.
a) This section applies only to a contract or transaction between a corporation
and:
1) One or more of the corporation’s directors, officers, or members; or
2) An entity or other organization in which one or more of the corporation’s
directors, officers, or members:
(A) Is a managerial official or a member; or
(B) Has a financial interest.
b) An otherwise valid contract or transaction is valid notwithstanding that a director, officer, or member of the corporation is present at or participates in the
meeting of the board of directors, of a committee of the board, or of the members that authorizes the contract or transaction, or votes to authorize the contract or transaction, if:
1) The material facts as to the relationship or interest and as to the contract
or transaction are disclosed to or known by:
(A) The corporation’s board of directors, a committee of the board of
directors, or the members in good faith and with ordinary care authorize the contract or transaction by the affirmative vote of the majority of the disinterested directors, committee members or members, regardless of whether the disinterested directors, committee
members or members constitute a quorum; or
(B) The members entitled to vote on the authorization of the contract or
transaction, and the contract or transaction is specifically approved
in good faith and with ordinary care by a vote of the members; or
2) The contract or transaction is fair to the corporation when the contract or
transaction is authorized, approved, or ratified by the board of directors,
a committee of the board of directors, or the members.
c) Common or interested directors or members of a corporation may be included
in determining the presence of a quorum at a meeting of the board, a committee
of the board, or members that authorizes the contract or transaction.
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status as an exempt organization under the IRC and subject the recipient
to penalties and other sanctions under the IRC. 138

F.

Critical Domain Expertise

In a for-profit setting, if your product is semiconductor chips, you
expect to have semiconductor engineering and manufacturing expertise
and experience represented on your board. If your product is computer
software, then software engineering expertise is a necessity. Accordingly,
if the mission of your nonprofit organization is to eradicate a certain
disease like ebola, the medical expertise germane to your stated mission
is required in abundance on your board. If your mission is subject to
cultural and political constraints imposed by the geographical and
political environment existing in vast spaces of the African continent, then
your board decision process should benefit from experience and expertise
in the relevant regional dynamics. Assessing whether you have too much
or not enough of this critical domain expertise represented on a nonprofit
board of directors will likely be an organizational challenge. In many
nonprofit organizations, laser focus on critical domain expertise at the
expense of appropriate audit committee or compensation committee
experience and background will introduce excessive risk to all involved.
G.

Executive Committee

In order for the enterprise to exercise the powers of the Board to
direct the business and affairs of the organization between meetings of the
Board, an executive committee is typically empowered. For example,
composition of this committee might consist of the Chairman of the board
and Chairpersons of all standing committees. Important considerations for
membership on this committee will be the ability of members to be
available on short notice (physical proximity) and other measures of
actual availability. AT&T’s Executive Committee Charter, in relevant
part, follows:
Committee Membership
Except as otherwise provided by the Board of Directors, the members
of the Committee shall be the Chairman of the Board and the
Chairpersons of each of the Audit, Corporate Development and Finance,
Corporate Governance and Nominating, Public Policy and Corporate
Reputation, and Human Resources Committees. The Chairman of the
138. See id at 179 (citing Rpt. on Exempt Organizations Executive Compensation Compliance
Project ̶ Parts I and II, March, 2007).
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Board shall also act as the Chairman of the Committee. Upon election
as the Chairman of the Board or the Chairperson of any of the foregoing
Committees, a Director shall automatically become a member of this
Committee (and Chairman of the Committee in the case of the Chairman
of the Board) and shall serve until such person no longer holds a
qualifying position or the person otherwise resigns or is removed by the
Board from his or her position with this Committee. Committee
members shall not have a fixed term.
Procedures
The Committee shall meet as often as it determines. The Committee may
request any officer or employee of the Company to attend a meeting of
the Committee or to meet with any consultant to the Committee. After
the Committee meets or otherwise takes action, it shall, as soon as
practicable, make a report of its activities at a meeting of the Board. The
Committee may form and delegate authority to subcommittees when
determined by the Committee to be necessary or appropriate.
Committee Responsibilities and Authority
The Committee shall have the authority to exercise all the power and
authority of the Board of Directors, to the extent permitted by law,
during the intervals between meetings of the Board . . . . 139

H.

Nominating and Governance Committee

Although crafted for application in a for-profit setting, the KimberlyClark Corporation’s Nominating and Corporate Governance Committee
Charter has material application to a nonprofit organization as well.
Accordingly, Kimberly-Clark’s N&G committee is responsible to:
periodically review and reassess the adequacy of this charter and
recommend any proposed changes of the charter to the Board for
approval. The Nominating and Corporate Governance Committee, in
consultation with the Chairman of the Board, shall recommend members
for appointment to, and the Chairman of, the Nominating and Corporate
Governance Committee to the Board for its approval. The Nominating
and Corporate Governance Committee shall be comprised of at least
three directors, each of whom is independent of management and the

139. Executive Committee of the Board of Directors of AT&T, Charter (as amended April 27,
2012), INVESTORS.ATT (2012) https://investors.att.com/~/media/Files/A/ATT-IR/committees-andcharters/executive-committee-charter.pdf [https://perma.cc/M5AY-FLKJ].

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2019

53

Akron Law Review, Vol. 52 [2019], Iss. 4, Art. 2

1024

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[52:971

Corporation. The Nominating and Corporate Governance Committee
shall maintain minutes of its meetings and report to the Board. 140

In terms of policy, the Kimberly-Clark N&G committee is charged with
the responsibility to:
(1) oversee the process by which individuals are nominated to become
board members;
(2) oversee matters of corporate governance, including advising the
Board on matters of:
(A) board organization, membership and function; and
(B) committee structure and membership; and
(3) oversee matters relating to sustainability, corporate social
responsibilities and corporate citizenship.
The Nominating and Corporate Governance Committee shall have the
authority to retain special legal, accounting or other consultants to
advise the Nominating and Corporate Governance Committee and to
assist it identifying suitable potential board nominees. The Nominating
and Corporate Governance Committee may request any officer or
employee of the Corporation or the Corporation’s outside counsel to
attend a meeting of the Nominating and Corporate Governance
Committee or to meet with any members of, or consultants to, the
Nominating and Corporate Governance Committee. 141

I.

Succession Planning

Succession planning is a necessary governance task facing every
enterprise. Nonprofits are no exception. Many smaller nonprofits may not
have the benefit of a management team deep in redundant talent. This
makes the death or disability of a chief executive officer particularly
problematic. An annual discussion of what the organization might do in
the event of the loss of key people or assets may prove exceedingly
important as the board considers future governance and management
needs.

140. Nominating and Corporate Governance Committee Charter, Kimberly-Clark Corporation
(as amended through Feb. 8, 2018), https://www.kimberly-clark.com/en/investors/corporategovernance [https://perma.cc/89GK-S9ZF].
141. Id.
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Marketing Expertise: Particularly Social Media

Social media marketing is of vital importance to any enterprise these
days, and may be more than a mystery to nonprofit boards comprised
mostly of those ages 40 or older. In terms of how today is different from
just five years ago, Houston director Deborah Cannon states, “social
media has made it far easier to get a nonprofit’s message out there. But
that also means that there are far more people writing about their
experiences. Thus, a less than perfect experience or false information gets
wide exposure . . . organizations need to closely monitor what is out
there.” 142
In the following example, the identity of the specific entity involved
is disguised. Professor Trautman recalls the story told by a marketing
friend of a nonprofit operating a major historical landmark [think Historic
Williamsburg, the historic mansions of Newport, Rhode Island, or a
famous botanical garden; none of these are the actual subject of this
example]. Because admission is relatively pricey, as might be suspected,
the primary demographic of those visiting this attraction for many years
has been affluent tourists and those within commuting distance, either at
or nearing retirement age. Accordingly, the primary traditional customer
base is in the process of dying off and must somehow be replaced with
much younger visitors (often much less affluent). How to solve this
marketing dilemma?
As might be expected, how to reach millennial, gen x, gen y, or
whatever the various components of the under-40 demographic may be
described is a major topic of discussion among management and the board
of this prominent nonprofit. Consider that Instagram provides its 800
million worldwide users with a fun and creative way to capture, edit and
share photographs, messages, and videos, either publicly or privately,
with pre-approved followers. 143 For the year 2017, Instagram discloses the
following list of most-followed celebrities:
1. Selena Gomez (130+ million followers)
2. Christiano Ronaldo (116+ million followers)
3. Ariana Grande (115+ million followers)
142. See e-mail from Deborah Cannon, Corporate and nonprofit director, to Lawrence J.
Trautman (Jan. 26, 2018) (on file with authors). See also Lawrence J. Trautman & Oliver W. Aho,
Crowdfunding, Entrepreneurship, and Start-Up Finance, Entrepreneur & Innovation Exchange (EiX)
(2019), http://ssrn.com/abstract=3251538 [https://perma.cc/A2U8-KD9M] (for a discussion of
crowdfunding and use of social media).
143. See Instagram, INSTAGRAM, https://www.instagram.com/?hl=en [https://perma.cc/A8C8HU8L].
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Beyoncé (108+ million followers)
Kim Kardashian West (104+ million followers)
Taylor Swift (104+ million followers)
Kylie Jenner (99.5+ million followers)
Dwayne Johnson (96+ million followers)
Justin Bieber (93.9+ million followers)
Kendall Jenner (84.8+ million followers) 144

And now we describe the missed opportunity at this nonprofit
because management didn’t have a plan in place to understand and capture
the wonder of social media. Unannounced, one of the above celebrities,
along with this celebrity’s entourage pays a visit to our example tourist
attraction and immediately starts sharing their enjoyable visit with
approximately 100 million followers. Someone on staff at the admissions
gate recognizes their famous guest and immediately informs management.
Because management presumably didn’t recognize this great promotional
opportunity, employees were instructed not to approach the celebrity until
“marketing can figure out what to do.” You guessed it, by the time
marketing and management figured out what to do, the famous guest
along with their 100 million followers had left the property. Contrast this
result with the celebrity’s next stop down the road where they were
embraced with refreshments, free products, open arms, and proceeded to
spend the afternoon showing the 100 million followers what a wonderful
time he/she was having with the new host’s product. The dollar value of
this endorsement, broadcast with big smiles from the celebrity, is beyond
estimation. Understanding internet marketing, social media, mobile
platforms, and the culture of sub-40 year olds is not a skill or deep
experience held by many above the age of 40. 145 For most nonprofit
organizations, these skills critically need to be represented in governance
discussions. 146
144. See Instagram’s 2017 Year in Review, INSTAGRAM-PRESS (2017), https://instagrampress.com/blog/2017/11/29/instagrams-2017-year-in-review/ [https://perma.cc/8VZK-XE3P].
145. See Trautman, et al., supra note 34; See also David Adam Friedman, Bringing Candor to
Charitable Solicitations, MD. L. REV. (forthcoming); Chao Guo & Gregory D. Saxton, Tweeting
Social Change: How Social Media are Changing Nonprofit Advocacy, 43(1) NONPROFIT & VOLUN.
SECTOR Q. 57 (2014); Kristen Lovejoy & Gregory D. Saxton, Information, Community, and Action:
How Nonprofit Organizations Use Social Media, 17(3) J. Computer-Mediated Comm. 337 (2012);
Gregory D. Saxton & Lili Wang, The Social Network Effect: The Determinants of Giving through
Social Media, 43 NONPROFIT & VOLUN. SECTOR Q. 850 (2014); Weiai Wayne Xu & Gregory D.
Saxton, Does Stakeholder Engagement Pay Off on Social Media? A Social Capital Perspective,
NONPROFIT & VOLUN. SECTOR Q. (forthcoming).
146. See Ahmed Abdel Moamen, An Actor-Based Middleware for Crowd-Sourced Services,
3(8) EAI Endorsed Transactions on Mobile Communications and Applications (2017).
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XI. ENGINEERING NONPROFIT GOVERNANCE SUCCESS
During the next few pages we present a methodology to assist a selfassessment of organizational leadership strengths and weaknesses. An
exhaustive treatment of this topic is not possible in the space allowed for
this article. However, we hope that our brief discussion and analysis
template will prove useful to nonprofit boards as they seek to structure a
more rewarding future for themselves.
A.

Talent Inventory and Search Matrix

What then are the most important attributes needed in director
candidates for a nonprofit’s particular situation? Assuming that all
director candidates meet the common criteria of required personal
attributes (high standards of ethical behavior; time availability;
outstanding achievement in the individual’s personal and professional
life; possession of strong interpersonal and communication skills;
independence; and soundness of judgment), we can then proceed to use a
blank matrix as a framework for analyzing specific needs. Our talent
inventory and search matrix presented as Exhibit 7, represents a two-step
process. The first stage involves a comprehensive discussion among the
board as to which talents and experiences are mission critical to achieve
top enterprise governance. This exercise is conducted within the context
of prioritizing the perceived importance of these various talents. As
needed skills are identified, they can be added to the matrix and moved
up and down the vertical axis as a result of debating and determining
relative importance. Second, an inventory of the skills and experiences of
existing board members is undertaken. Thus, after defining existing and
desired people strengths, Exhibit 7 will hopefully assist with board
discussions aimed at identifying needed skills and in candidate selection.
The matrix methodology facilitates discussion as you seek to define
the experience and skills wish list that is important to the organization’s
future success. It may be as simple as moving yellow Post-it notes on a
wall to enable moving and repositioning of each skill-set to determine an
agreement of relative importance. The discussion of must-have skills may
also help determine board size. Presented below is a logic road-map that
might be utilized to assess needs and recruit directors having the skills and
experience that will help to optimize composition of the new board.
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The Chair and CEO Roles Are Separate

A threshold issue is separation of the board chair role from that of
CEO—they are two demanding jobs. In recognition of the importance of
this issue in a for-profit, reporting company setting, Section 972 of DoddFrank legislation signed into law on July 21, 2010, requires disclosure as
to whether the same individual serves as both CEO and Chairman of the
board and why or why not. 147 For most high-performance enterprises there
are two full-time jobs represented by the CEO position and the distinct
function of running the board, which falls to a Lead Director or nonexecutive chair. 148
C.

The Audit (Risk) Committee Challenge

From our prior discussion of must have skills and experience, we
know that at least one, maybe two, and preferably three audit committee
candidates who qualify as financial experts are optimal. In a for-profit,
publicly-traded company, one director must qualify as a financial expert.
This also seems like an important attribute for a nonprofit as well. If two
directors qualify as financial experts, then an audit committee vice chair
position may be filled for succession purposes, and three qualified
individuals will bring even more strength to the board’s audit committee.
Trautman and Altenbaumer-Price have also suggested that the Audit
Committee (in the absence of a risk committee) may be the appropriate
place to exercise corporate governance of Information Technology (IT),
with appropriate IT skills and experience needing to be considered. 149
Such an approach to filling these audit committee needs will allow for
directors to amass years in service (particularly helpful in building an
understanding of the most important audit issues facing an enterprise). In
addition, having directors in various age categories will help to provide
for orderly education as to company board mechanics and succession. The

147. See Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. § 972
(2010).
148. See David F. Larcker & Brian Tayan, Chairman and CEO: The Controversy Over Board
Leadership Structure ROCK CTR. FOR CORP. GOV., Stanford University Closer Look Series, Corporate
Governance Research Initiative (2016), https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/faculty-research/publications/
chairman-ceo-controversy-over-board-leadership-structure [https://perma.cc/25PR-D5MM].
149. See Lawrence J. Trautman & Kara Altenbaumer-Price, The Board’s Responsibility for
Information Technology Governance, 28 JOHN MARSHALL J. OF COMP. & INFOR. LAW, 313 (2011).
See also Andrea H. Tapia, Louis-Marie Ngamassi Tchouakeu, Edgar Maldonado & Carleen F.
Maitland, Crossing Borders, Organizations, Levels, and Technologies: IS Collaboration in
Humanitarian Action, 9(1) INFO. TECH. & INT’L DEV. 1 (Spring 2013).

https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol52/iss4/2

58

Trautman and Ford: Nonprofit Governance: The Basics

2018]

NONPROFIT GOVERNANCE: THE BASICS

1029

advent of new technologies such as blockchain 150 and quantum
computing 151 also require additional board governance skills and
experience.
D.

The Cyber Threat

Only within the past few decades have cyber threats grown to
become a major problem for every enterprise.152 The governance of
enterprise data and cyber vulnerabilities is perhaps the most difficult
challenge facing boards everywhere. 153 At the same time, the acute
shortage of computer engineers who have prior governance experience
combine to make these talents exceedingly difficult to identify and recruit.

150. See Lawrence J. Trautman & Mason J. Molesky, A Primer for Blockchain, 88 UMKC L.
Rev. (2019), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3324660 [https://perma.cc/G9AU-UCXW]; Walter G.
Johnson, Blockchain Meets Genomics: Governance Considerations for Promoting Food Safety and
Public Health, J. FOOD L. & POL’Y (Forthcoming). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3344839
[https://perma.cc/9RVR-7P2F].
151. See Walter G. Johnson, Governance Tools for the Second Quantum Revolution, 59
JURIMETRICS (2019). https://ssrn.com/abstract=3350830 [https://perma.cc/E5MB-77AE].
152. See David F. Larcker, Peter C. Reiss & Brian Tayan, Critical Update Needed:
Cybersecurity Expertise in the Boardroom ROCK CTR. FOR CORP. GOV., Stanford University Closer
Look Series, Corporate Governance Research Initiative (2016), https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/
sites/gsb/files/publication-pdf/cgri-closer-look-69-cybersecurity-experise-boardroom.pdf
[https://perma.cc/CHR7-ABFU]; David D. Schein & Lawrence J. Trautman, The Dark Web and
Employer Liability, 18(1) Colo. Tech. L.J. (2019), http://ssrn.com/abstract=3251479
[https://perma.cc/N95N-AYRP]; Lawrence J. Trautman, Jason Triche & James C. Wetherbe,
Corporate Information Technology Governance Under Fire, 8 J. STRATEGIC & INT’L STUD. 105
(2013); Lawrence J. Trautman, Cybersecurity: What About U.S. Policy?, 2015 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. &
POL’Y 341 (2015); Lawrence J. Trautman, Congressional Cybersecurity Oversight: Who’s Who &
How It Works, 5 J. L. & CYBER WARFARE 147 (2016); Lawrence J. Trautman, Is Cyberattack The
Next Pearl Harbor?, 18 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 232 (2016).
153. See Lawrence J. Trautman, Managing Cyberthreat, 33 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. 230
(2016); Lawrence J. Trautman, How Google Perceives Customer Privacy, Cyber, E-commerce,
Political and Regulatory Compliance Risks (2013), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3067298
[https://perma.cc/3LYG-LUVC]; Lawrence J. Trautman & Peter C. Ormerod, Industrial Cyber
Vulnerabilities: Lessons from Stuxnet and the Internet of Things, 72 U. MIAMI L. REV. 761 (2018);
Lawrence J. Trautman & George P. Michaely, The SEC & The Internet: Regulating the Web of Deceit,
68 CONSUMER FIN. L. Q. RPT. 262 (2014); Lawrence J. Trautman, E-Commerce and Electronic
Payment System Risks: Lessons from PayPal, 17 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 261 (2016); Lawrence J.
Trautman, Is Disruptive Blockchain Technology the Future of Financial Services?, 69 CONSUMER
FIN. L.Q. RPT. 232 (2016).
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Examples of major cyber breaches abound. 154 Exhibit 2 illustrates the
growing number of cyber breach incidents per year. 155
Exhibit 2

Source: Risk Based Security, Inc. (2018)

Just as the raw number of cyber breach incidents grows every year,
so too does the corresponding cost to consumers and all within society.
As a proxy for the continued growth in injury to consumers due to cyber
breach, Exhibit 3 shows the Number of Records Exposed by Year (in
millions). 156

154. See Lawrence J. Trautman & Peter C. Ormerod, Corporate Directors’ and Officers’
Cybersecurity Standard of Care: The Yahoo Data Breach, 66 AM. U. L. REV. 1231, 1290 (2017)
(examples of major cyber breaches).
155. See Risk Based Security, Data Breach QuickView Report, Year End 2017, 5, (2018)
https://www.rpsins.com/media/2884/mc_0000634a-yearendreport.pdf
[https://perma.cc/A67N2B7G].
156. Id.
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Exhibit 3

Source: Risk Based security, Inc. (2018)

Although often not large enough to reach the headlines of most
newspapers, a brief sample of reported nonprofit organization breaches
are depicted in Exhibit 4. 157

157. See Data Breaches, PRIVACY RIGHTS CLEARINGHOUSE, https://www.privacyrights.org/
data-breaches?title=&org_type%5B%5D=263&taxonomy_vocabulary_11_tid%5B%
5D=2436&taxonomy_vocabulary_11_tid%5B%5D=2434 [https://perma.cc/2ATR-Q24N].
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Exhibit 4
Data Breach Examples Among Nonprofits
Organization

Date Made Public

Location

Pension Fund of
The Christian
Church

01/16/2018

Indianapolis,
Indiana

SAY San Diego

12/28/2017

San Diego,
California

Walk in the World
Ministries

07/13/2017

Elgin, Illinois

YMCA of San
Diego

07/12/2017

San Diego,
California

Veterans of
Foreign Wars of
the United States

04/11/2014

Kansas City,
Missouri

What Happened
(Records Breached)
Names, SSN,
financial account or
credit or debit card
numbers . .
.breached
A citizen returned
some paper files to
their office that
were found in a
filing cabinet
purchased from a
salvage store
Nonprofit notified
by third party ecommerce provider
of potential breach
of credit card, debit
card, or checking
account information
used to receive and
process donations
Excel spreadsheet
containing personal
information of
certain YMCA
employees was
inadvertently sent
over email to
certain YMCA
employees
Hacker, thought to
be in China, was
able to download
tables containing
names, addresses,
SSNs, of
approximately
55,000 VFW
members

Source: Privacy Rights Clearing House (2018)
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While a detailed discussion of cyber enterprise risk management far
exceeds the scope of this article, some useful resources are listed below.158
A helpful explanation of a way to think about the management of
cybersecuritry, The Profit-Maximizing Model of Security, 159 is presented
by professors Ormerod and Trautman in Exhibit 5.
Exhibit 5
The Ormerod-Trautman Profit-Maximizing Model of Security 160

Here, at the leftmost point on the curve, enterprise data security is so
abysmal that few, if any, users trust the enterprise with their Personally
Identifiable Information (PII), therefore rendering the profitability or
efficiency of the enterprise’s data security function a nullity. To
paraphrase, zero security measures as shown at the bottom left-hand side
of the graph result in zero users and, therefore zero profitability
(efficiency). But, as the enterprise security improves, an increasing
number of users trust the enterprise with their PII and the risk of data
breach and loss of users’ PII decreases, both of which contribute to
increased profitability (efficiency). At a point where the number of users
is maximized, increased security measures (spending on cybersecurity)
result in limiting the usability of the data/website and thus decrease
profitability (efficiency). Thus, taken to an extreme, excessive security
measures may, theoretically, drive usability to the point of futility,
158. See Lawrence J. Trautman & Peter C. Ormerod, WannaCry, Ransomware, and the
Emerging Threat to Corporations, 86 TENN. L. REV. (2019). Lawrence J. Trautman & Kara
Altenbaumer-Price, D&O Insurance: A Primer, 1 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 337 (2012).
159. See Trautman & Ormerod, supra note 155 at 1290. See also Peter C. Ormerod, Ormerod,
Peter, A Private Enforcement Remedy for Information Misuse, 60 B.C. L. REV. (forthcoming).
160. Id.
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achieving no additional benefit from the next dollar spent on cybersecurity
and decreasing utility of additional spending. For nonprofits, the
Ormerod-Trautman Model can be rephrased to illustrate the costminimizing level of security, as shown in Exhibit 6. 161
Exhibit 6
Ormerod-Trautman Nonprofit Cost-Minimizing Model of Security

Cost

Cost-Minimizing Model of Security

Security

As professor Ormerod explains:
Here, on the left, cyber services are costly due to the threat of litigation
and penalties; on the right, cyber services are costly because they are
prohibitively difficult to use and cost money to generate / host. This reconception allows nonprofits and governments to express security
within the confines of a dollar amount. 162

The critical takeaway is that little or no digital security may be just
as damaging to an enterprise’s financial health as implementing overly
excessive security. Professors Trautman and Ormerod further observe:
As this area of the law develops and matures in the coming years, courts,
regulators, shareholders, and commentators will increasingly view the
relationship between data security and [enterprise efficiency] as
described in [Exhibits 5 and 6 herein]. Perhaps the most important
161. See Trautman & Ormerod, supra note 155.
162. See Notes from discussion between professor Peter C. Ormerod & Lawrence J. Trautman
(Feb. 12, 2018) (on file with authors).
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implication of embracing the relationship depicted in the [OrmerodTrautman model] is that there is a profit-maximization [or cost effective]
amount of security. And, as this view of the relationship between
security and profitability is embraced, there can be little doubt that the
various constituencies of stakeholders will increasingly expect corporate
officers and directors to actively seek their company’s profitmaximizing level of data security. 163

E.

Capacity Expansion

In a philanthropic organization, lessons learned from prior successful
fundraising experience are often considered a premium skill desired for
board members. Raising money and cultivating mission support from likeminded community members is a difficult task, particularly in a difficult
economy. Board of directors candidates who have been down this road
before may prove particularly useful additions to any organization. Within
recent years, knowledge and experience with social media marketing is
also highly valuable as discussed above.
F. The Mission Critical Challenge
Populating a board with directors having the skills and experience
unique to the primary mission of the nonprofit is essential. Here, we will
logically seek to draw upon those candidates who have successfully
guided other enterprises from our board’s stage of development to
leadership in the organization’s desired future setting. We want to ensure
that represented on our board is ample understanding of those factors
which will determine success in the organization’s mission and allow the
board to play a supportive and visionary role in monitoring operations,
management, and assisting in crafting strategy for success. If our stated
mission is to provide healthcare clinics to underserved inner city
communities, our board will probably be well served with several
physician directors having actual experience serving this type of
community need. If we determine that drug abuse is a major problem, then
a social worker with on-point experience may prove optimal.
G.

The Governance Challenge

Serving competently on a board requires understanding of a
considerable body of enterprise (corporate) governance knowledge. Novel
and disruptive technological innovations create a constant challenge to
163.
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those seeking to govern any enterprise. 164 Corporate governance is a
legally-intensive endeavor. An understanding of the legal foundation of
corporate governance is a requisite for the knowledgeable discharge of
fiduciary duties and responsibilities owed by each director. Therefore,
each director must understand the duties of care and loyalty as refined
over the years by developments in relevant case law and the regulatory
impact brought about by relevant regulation. While non-attorneys may
grow to understand the ramifications of these laws through years of board
service with the education and guidance provided by proximity to skilled
legal counsel, people are not born understanding the role and constraints
surrounding the discharge of these duties and responsibilities.
Accordingly, years of progressively responsible enterprise governance
experience will be a valuable attribute of attractive candidates. It is no
wonder that approximately 27 percent of all directors serving on Texas
for-profit corporate boards have a legal background. 165 More about
corporate governance may be learned from the National Association of
Corporate Directors (NACD). 166
H.

Matrix Analysis

The matrix template included as Exhibit 7 is a first step toward a
needs analysis for any nonprofit board. For this example, involving a
hypothetical non-profit board for an inner-city healthcare clinic, we start
with an inventory of current board members. Use of this assessment tool
will hopefully result in productive discussions about needed skills and
experience, producing the start of a plan for optimal candidate
recruitment. In our example, it may be reasonable to seek three audit
committee members who will each qualify as a financial expert. As a
starting search criterion, director candidates having drug addiction
treatment, social media marketing, and legal experience is desired. With

164. See Lawrence J. Trautman & Mason J. Molesky, A Primer for Blockchain, 88(1) UMKC
L. REV. (2019); Lawrence J. Trautman, Bitcoin, Virtual Currencies and the Struggle of Law and
Regulation to Keep Pace, 102 MARQ. L. REV. 447 (2018); Lawrence J. Trautman & Alvin C. Harrell,
Bitcoin Versus Regulated Payment Systems: What Gives?, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 1041 (2017);
Lawrence J. Trautman, Virtual Currencies: Bitcoin & What Now After Liberty Reserve, Silk Road,
and Mt. Gox?, 20 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 13 (2014).
165. See Lawrence J. Trautman, Who Sits on Texas Corporate Boards?, Texas Corporate
Directors: Who They Are and What They Do, 16 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 44 (2016); Lawrence J.
Trautman, Anthony “Tony” Luppino & Malika S. Simmons, Some Key Things U.S. Entrepreneurs
Need to Know About The Law and Lawyers, 46 TEX. J. BUS. L. 155 (2016) (many entrepreneurial
considerations are desirable and transferable to a nonprofit enterprise).
166. Lawrence J. Trautman, Present at the Creation: Reflections on the Early Years of the
National Association of Corporate Directors, 17 DUQ. BUS. L.J. 1 (2015).
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several members of the board of directors no longer available to serve, a
significant opportunity exists to recruit needed talent and experience and
to expand the size and scope of the new board.
1. Continuing CEO and Director #1
Our first continuing director is also one of our founding board
members. She is a medical doctor and business school graduate. She
enjoys the challenge of day-to-day operations, welcomes the ability to
grow the enterprise & seems up to the task.
2. Continuing Director #2: Medical Doctor
Our next continuing director is a highly-regarded medical doctor
who has been responsible for launching a number of inner-city community
projects, including a food bank. He is an internal medicine doctor by
training and his network of relationships in this space should remain a
major enterprise asset.
3. Non-Continuing Director #3: Lawyer (Departing Board)
This lawyer has served on our board and audit committee for many
years, will retire in a few months, and plans to move to Florida. Because
these talents and experience will no longer be available to our board, all
experience and talent attributes for this director will be removed from our
talent inventory appearing at Exhibit 7.
4. Non-Continuing Director #4: Community Leader
This former college president has served on our board,
compensation, and nominating and governance committees for many
years. All stakeholders of this nonprofit seem to agree that this individual
makes significant contributions of time and talent to our mission.
5. Continuing Director #5: Religious Leader
This civic and religious leader has served on our board and audit
committee for many years, is retiring and plans to move away from our
geographic area to be in close proximity to children and grandchildren.
Because these talents and experience will no longer be available to our
board, all experience and talent attributes for this director will be removed
from our talent inventory appearing at Exhibit 7.
6. Continuing Director #6: Accountant
This director has many years of accounting and auditing experience,
has served on our board and audit committee for many years, and will be
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our single director having audit committee skills and experience.
Accordingly, identifying and recruiting members for our audit committee
will be a primary focus.
7. Continuing Director #7: High School Counselor
This director continues to be a major contributor to the mission of
this enterprise. She has served for many years on the compensation and
nominating and governance committees.
I.

The Talent and Experience Inventory

The narrative information for continuing directors presented above
is depicted in the first few columns of Exhibit 7. As the nominating and
governance committee and full board review and discuss the skills and
experience needed for future board composition, the following thoughts
and criteria emerge. First, this board will benefit from additional medical
doctor and, in particular, drug treatment experience in our particular
community. A consensus is reached that one or more candidates having
social work experience in our community is a good idea. Audit committee
experience, expertise, and cyber risk awareness is also needed. Continued
discussion points to an awareness of a lack of social media sensitivity and
marketing prowess within our nonprofit. A board member having these
skills is desired. Our inner-city healthcare clinic seems to be living a very
risky existence due to its present limited funding and sources of revenue.
Accordingly, there is general agreement that director candidates having
philanthropic experience, and personal contacts with likely donors are
desired.
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Experience / Skills

#
1
CEO

MD

Director

Candidate

Exhibit 7
Example of Inner-City Healthcare Clinic
Board Talent Matrix Analysis

Independent (Yes or No)

N

Y

Medical Doctor
Drug Treatment
Experience
Our Community Social
Work Exp.

X

X

Philanthropy Experience
Accounting / Financial
Expert
Social Media Marketing
Skills
Legal Skills &
Experience
Prior Audit Committee
Experience
Prior Compensation
Comm Exp.
Prior Governance/Nom
Comm Exp.

#
2

#3

#
4

#5

#
6

#
7

A

B

C

D

E

F

N/
A

Y

N/
A

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

X

Y

Y

Y

Y
X

Y

Y
Y

X

X

Y

X

X

Y

Other:

1. Candidate A: Retired Audit Partner
Candidate A is an experienced audit partner at one of the world’s
largest auditing service firms with considerable nonprofit audit
experience. A financial expert, she also brings directorship experience;
having served as audit chair on an industry board and as a member of
compensation and governance and nominating committees.
2. Candidate B: Retired Social Worker
This retired, former inner-city social worker brings considerable
experience in our local community. Her vast experience with our
neighborhoods, understanding of needed health-related services available
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elsewhere throughout the community and existing relationships with
providers—all appears very attractive. In addition, she has prior
organizational governance experience.
3. Candidate C: Financial Expert
She is a veteran audit partner at a major accounting firm and qualifies
as a financial expert, as defined. 167 She also brings prior audit and
compensation experience gained while on the board of a major hospital
management company.
4. Candidate D: Attorney
She is an experienced attorney with many year’s experience
representing corporate board clients in the discharge of their fiduciary
duties. Our nonprofit views this expertise to be an absolute missioncritical component to success, and these skills have been defined as
particularly essential.
5. Candidate E: Former Hospital CEO
This former hospital CEO had medical administrative experience
about fifteen years ago and presided over a medical clinic outreach
program affiliated with his hospital in another large city at that time. His
hospital, medical and hospital liability, strategic planning, and prior
executive committee experience is attractive. Also trained as a medical
doctor, if nominated, this will be his first nonprofit board.
6. Candidate F: Former CFO
She is a former CFO of a successful high-growth cardio-device
manufacturer. She joined while the company was at venture-stage and
served as CFO during the high growth phase. She qualifies as a financial
expert, and has corporate governance experience gained by virtue of
serving on two different company audit, compensation, and governance
and nominating committees. She is now looking to give back by
contributing her time and energies where most needed to her community.
7. Candidate G: Attorney Wants to Make Pro Bono
Contribution
This lawyer is an attractive candidate by virtue of his serving
previously as general counsel to a regional hospital system. Among his

167. See Lawrence J. Trautman, Who Qualifies As An Audit Committee Financial Expert Under
SEC Regulations and NYSE Rules?, 11 DEPAUL BUS. & COMM. L.J. 205 (2013).
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peers, he appears highly regarded and knows the health delivery business,
legal issues involved, and has executive and audit committee experience.
8. Candidate H: Financial/Wealth Management Advisor
This individual has an MBA degree with a concentration in finance
and investments and has worked for many years providing wealth
management services. Having several members on a nonprofit’s board
with this type of background is probably a good idea and may decrease
the likelihood of experiencing a Bernie Madoff type of investment
outcome. However, it is also a good idea to have an understanding up front
that no funds of the nonprofit will be held at this director’s corporation or
affiliated entity and that no commissions will accrue to any party in any
way affiliated with any director.
9. Candidates: Director of Numerous Nonprofits
Several board candidates bring prior philanthropic board service.
Several are considered pillars of the community and highly active among
many important community organizations. Their previous fundraising
experience and knowledge of what works and who tends to have the
capacity and desire to give financial support is clearly mission critical to
our nonprofit’s future.
J.

The Analysis Process

A director search will involve many considerations tailored to the
unique requirements of the organization involved. The Nomination and
Governance committee will likely have many director candidates with
diverse talents to consider. Among nonprofit boards, it is often helpful to
bring a discussion to the full board explaining the matrix analytical
process employed and identifying those talents particularly being sought.
This step may produce suggestions about individuals who might fill these
vacancies in talent and experience. Hopefully, considerations presented
here will provoke thoughtful discussions and better decisions.
XII.CONCLUSION
It is every director’s legal duty of care that requires a careful, diligent
approach to the effective recruitment and selection of new directors.
Optimal board composition, that is, the best mix of director skills and
experience will depend on many enterprise-specific variables. Some of
the most important of these variables include: (1) enterprise lifecycle
stage; (2) extent to which certain experiences and skills are mission
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critical (detailed understanding of target culture, mission, stakeholder
composition, and operational risk); (3) unique technology dependence
(social media); and (4) need for capacity expansion (fundraising). A
fundamental starting point for director recruitment and selection will ask,
“What human qualities are desired for every board member?” Every board
should agree on a clear statement of desired personal attributes of all board
members to provide guidance to the nominating and governance
committee as they search for director candidates.
High standards of ethical behavior are an absolute must. The last
decade has brought significant increases to the time demands placed on
each director. Independence is now required for members of the audit,
compensation, and nominating and governance committees in a for-profit
setting where shareholders are protected by SEC regulations. Adoption of
this reasoning by nonprofits seems prudent, and each board should adopt
a clearly-written statement specifying what constitutes director
independence. Ideal director candidates will possess a demonstrated
soundness of judgment and effectiveness, as evidenced by a pro-active
and results-oriented approach to problem solving. They will also have the
ability to make independent, analytical inquiries about challenging
organizational issues. Whatever the board has determined to be its major
weakness or biggest challenge should probably be the area of focus for
new board talent. At the fifty-thousand-foot level, the question that must
be asked and answered by every board nominating committee is “What Is
It That the Organization Does to Create Value? Do members of the board
understand this value creation process – so they might govern it
effectively?”
After exploring current board membership strengths and
weaknesses, various desirable skills and experience of director candidates
are explored with a matrix methodology utilized to assist with analysis.
Finally, the benefit of highly diverse approaches to problem solving and
broadly different talents and experiences seems desirable when seeking to
engineer the optimal people mix for productive small group decision
making. The difficult monitoring of enterprise systems and a likely
constant flow of future problems will require skillful navigation. It doesn’t
seem healthy to want our decisions to be made by nine directors having
the same narrow prisms in which they view the world. It is our hope that
analysis considerations presented here will evoke thoughtful discussions
and better decisions by nonprofit organizations.

https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol52/iss4/2

72

